# SERBIA (YUGOSLAVIA)

## Bosniaks

Activity: 1990-1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Although nationalist sentiment was present beforehand, the various Bosniak nationalist parties were formed in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. In particular, the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA) was formed on May 26, 1990. The SDA advocated a “sovereign and united Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic democratic state, region, nation and equal citizens” (Stranka Demokratske Acije 2012). The SDA won the most seats in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first multi-party elections in November 1990.
* Bosnia became independent in 1992 (according to Correlates of War), Bosnia’s date of independence is in early April 1992 while Gleditsch & Ward (1999) peg the date of independence to late April 1992. Hence we code an end to the movement in 1992.
  + Note: in 1970 Alja Izetbegovic published the contested manifesto “Islamic Declaration” (Burg and Shoup 1999: 46). He proposed a new model for the relationship between state, Islam and society (Hamourtziadou 2002: 150). While some Serb authorities considered this as a claim for the creation of a fundamentalist Muslim Bosnian state, the manifesto itself does not mention Bosnia or Bosniaks, and Izetbegovic denied this and stated that it should be considered as a theory for the entire Muslim world (BBC News 2003). Thus, before 1990, there were no organized claims for self-determination.
* [start date: 1990; end date: 1992]

**Dominant claim**

* Although nationalist sentiment was present beforehand, the various Bosniak nationalist parties were formed in 1990, hence the start date of the movement. In particular, the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA) was formed on May 26, 1990. The SDA advocated a “sovereign and united Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic democratic state, region, nation and equal citizens” (Stranka Demokratske Acije 2012). The SDA won the most seats in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first multi-party elections in November 1990. Thus independence is coded as the dominant claim. [1990-1992: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date: 1992]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Bosniaks consists of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Bosnian parliament declared the republic’s independence on October 14, 1991. The Serbian and Croatian minorities rejected this declaration (Raic 2002: 414). The international community refused to recognize Bosnia’s referendum because it was made without a popular referendum (Richter and Gavric 2010: 837). [1991: independence declaration]
* On February 29 and March 1, 1992, a referendum was held on whether or not Bosnia should be independent. The vast majority of voters voted in favor of Bosnia’s independence. The Serbs in BiH boycotted the referendum. Shortly thereafter, on March 6, 1992, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared an independent state (Raic 2002: 414). Due to Bosnia’s declaration of independence, war between the Bosnians and the Serb and Croat minorities erupted in the beginning of April 1992 (Meier 1999; Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005: 193). [1992: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Fighting had erupted in Bosnia already before independence, but it appears to mainly concern the Bosnian state-Serb dyad and not the Bosniaks-Yugoslavia dyad. UCDP/PRIO, for instance, reports that: “Already by March 1992, violent clashes between different armed formations in Bosnia became increasingly frequent. On 3 March, fighting between Serbian militia and Bosnian police in the northern Bosnia-Herzegovina town of Bosanski Brod resulted in several deaths. The violence escalated by April-May, with killings occurring regularly in Sarajevo and in other parts of Bosnia.” Thus, we code the Bosniaks as NVIOLSD throughout (also see Meier 1999). [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Since 1946, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia. However, in the initial years of Yugoslavia’s existence, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s administration was dominated by the local Serbs. Moreover, the Bosniaks were not recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations.
* This began to change in the late 1960s. In 1968, the Muslims were recognized as a nationality of Yugoslavia equal to Serbs and Montenegrins (Bieber n.d.; Mitchell 2010: 311). In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). With the 1971 constitutional reforms and the 1974 constitution Yugoslavia became ever more decentralized (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000; Hamourtziadou 2002: 147). Critically, the 1974 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples in the republican administration and the party, thus increasing the influence of the Bosnia’s Muslims (which comprised the majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina) over the regional government (Bieber & Keil 2009).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In late 1991, Serbia launched an economic blockade against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many Bosnians believed the blockade was used as a bargaining chip by the Serbian government to force Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain a constituent part of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia (Helsinki Watch Report 1992: 17-18). [1991: autonomy restriction]
* Bosnia held a referendum on independence in late February/early March 1992; recognition by the EC and the US followed in April. Yet Yugoslavia (or what was left of it – Serbia and Montenegro – and thus essentially the Milosevic regime) did not recognize Bosnia’s independence until after the 1995 Dayton Agreement (UNMIBH). Thus we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics and enjoyed significant autonomy under the 1974 constitution. The Bosniaks (the majority group in Bosnia and Herzegovina) had guaranteed proportional representation proportional representation in the republican administration and the party under BiH’s 1974 constitution. [1990-1992: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Bosnia held a referendum on independence in late February/early March 1992; recognition by the EC and the US followed in April (Raic 2002: 414). [1992: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bosniaks |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bosniak/Muslims |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34504000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. Self-exclusion = powerless. [1990-1991: senior partner; 1992: powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.1; 1992: 0.11]

**Regional concentration**

* The Bosniaks form but a minority in Bosnia and Hercegovina. According to the 1981 census, there were 2 million Bosniaks in Yugoslavia, 1.63 million in BiH (39.5% of total population). This share increased in 1991, but still, the Bosniaks remained a minority in BiH as a whole: 2.35 million Bosniaks, 1.9 million in BiH (43.5% of total population).
* BiH is famous for its checkered ethnic geography, and the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) live in varying proportions throughout the country.
* Nevertheless, there existed a spatially contiguous territory within Bosnia that crosses the threshold for spatial concentration: today’s Federation of BiH. According to the 1991 census, approx. 60% of all Bosniaks lived in today’s Federation of BiH, and they made up approx. 52% of the local population (Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 20). [concentrated]
  + We also investigated district (municipality) level data from the 1991 census.
  + The Bosniaks make up an absolute majority in 31 municipalities, a relative majority in another 13 municipalities, and >40% but no relative majority in another 7 municipalities. Most of these municipalities lie in central and northwestern Bosnia, though six of them lie in the country’s eastern part in the Bihac area. While the resulting area looks a bit checkered, the 45 municipalities in central and northwestern Bosnia make up a spatially contiguous territory. 65% of the 2.35 million Bosniaks live there, and they make up 57% of the local population.
  + For the detailed census figures see below. Note that we counted Sarajevo as one municipality, while in the census it is counted as 10. Total number of municipalities was thus 100.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **District** | **Total** | **Bosniaks** | **Bosniaks %** |
| **Central and northwestern Bosnia** | | |  |
| **Absolute majority** | |  |  |
| Živinice | 54783 | 44017 | 80.3% |
| Kalesija | 41809 | 33137 | 79.3% |
| Breza | 17317 | 13079 | 75.5% |
| Srebrenica | 36666 | 27572 | 75.2% |
| Olovo | 16956 | 12699 | 74.9% |
| Srebrenik | 40896 | 30528 | 74.6% |
| Visoko | 46160 | 34373 | 74.5% |
| Kladanj | 16070 | 11621 | 72.3% |
| Tešanj | 48480 | 34941 | 72.1% |
| Banovići | 26590 | 19162 | 72.1% |
| Gračanica | 59134 | 42599 | 72.0% |
| Jablanica | 12691 | 9099 | 71.7% |
| Goražde | 37573 | 26296 | 70.0% |
| Lukavac | 57070 | 38080 | 66.7% |
| Bratunac | 33619 | 21535 | 64.1% |
| Višegrad | 21199 | 13471 | 63.5% |
| Rogatica | 21978 | 13209 | 60.1% |
| Gradačac | 56581 | 33856 | 59.8% |
| Zavidovići | 57164 | 34198 | 59.8% |
| Zvornik | 81295 | 48102 | 59.2% |
| Gornji Vakuf | 25181 | 14063 | 55.8% |
| Zenica | 145517 | 80359 | 55.2% |
| Vlasenica | 33942 | 18727 | 55.2% |
| Donji Vakuf | 24544 | 13509 | 55.0% |
| Kakanj | 55950 | 30528 | 54.6% |
| Konjic | 43878 | 23815 | 54.3% |
| Foča | 40513 | 20790 | 51.3% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Relative majority** | |  |  |
| Sarajevo | 527049 | 259470 | 49.2% |
| Tuzla | 131618 | 62669 | 47.6% |
| Žepče | 22966 | 10820 | 47.1% |
| Maglaj | 43388 | 19569 | 45.1% |
| Travnik | 70747 | 31813 | 45.0% |
| Brčko | 87627 | 38617 | 44.1% |
| Stolac | 18681 | 8101 | 43.4% |
| Bugojno | 46889 | 19697 | 42.0% |
| Doboj | 102549 | 41164 | 40.1% |
| Jajce | 45007 | 17380 | 38.6% |
| Mostar | 126628 | 43856 | 34.6% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **>40% yet minority** | |  |  |
| Ključ | 37391 | 17696 | 47.3% |
| Čajniče | 8956 | 4024 | 44.9% |
| Busovača | 18879 | 8451 | 44.8% |
| Vitez | 27859 | 11514 | 41.3% |
| Kiseljak | 24164 | 9778 | 40.5% |
| Han Pijesak | 6348 | 2543 | 40.1% |
| Ugljevik | 25587 | 10241 | 40.0% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Eastern Bosnia** | |  |  |
| Cazin | 63409 | 61693 | 97.3% |
| Velika Kladuša | 52908 | 48305 | 91.3% |
| Bosanska Krupa | 58320 | 43104 | 73.9% |
| Bihać | 70732 | 46737 | 66.1% |
| Sanski Most | 60307 | 28136 | 46.7% |
| Prijedor | 112543 | 49351 | 43.9% |

**Kin**

* MAR codes Turkey’s Turks as ethnic kin; this appears rather far fetched, and EPR does not follow MAR, but code ethnic kin due to the Bosniaks in Croatia, which are below the numeric threshold (approx. 40,000). The Joshua project reports 283,000 Bosniaks in Germany, 102,000 in Turkey, and 112,000 in the US, but many of them would be refugees from the Bosnian civil war, which broke out in 1992. [no kin]

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## Bosnian Croats

Activity: 1991-1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Bosnian offshoot of Croatia’s HDZ, HDZ BiH, was formed in August 1990. Initially the HDZ adopted a relatively moderate position. Then, in late 1991, hardliners with irredentist intentions took control of HDZ BiH and began to make self-determination claims. November 18, 1991, they formed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZHB), claiming the right to “a separate or distinct political, cultural, economic and territorial [entity] in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (ICTY 2001; Caspersen n.d.). The foundation of the HZHB was a direct consequence of the Bosnian independence declaration in late 1991. 1991 is coded as the start date.
* Bosnia attained independence in 1992, thus the end date. [start date: 1991; end date: host change (1992)]

**Dominant claim**

* Caspersen (n.d.): “once Yugoslavia started unraveling, the Bosnian Croats were deeply divided over what course to pursue: one faction supported Bosnia’s independence while the other demanded unification with Croatia.” The Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna was founded in late 1991 in order to establish the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna that was proclaimed as an autonomous sub-state within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but its ultimate goal was reunification with Croatia. We code an irredentist claim for 1991-1992 (note: Croatia had effectively been independent by the time the movement emerged, thus we code an irredentist claim also in 1991). [1991-1992: irredentist claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* See above. [start date: 1991; end date: host change (1992)]

**Claimed territory**

* The claim of this movement broadly related to the “Community of Herceg-Bosna” that was declared during the ensuing war. The exact contours of this territory are not clear as claims changed as a result of war dynamics and displacement. We code this claim according to the map provided in Wikipedia (2020) and flag the claim as ambiguous.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* The Bosnian Branch of HDZ, HDZ BiH, received substantial support from Zagreb. This backing and the increasing intensity of the conflict eventually resulted in a change in the party leadership when Mate Boban, a hard-line Herzegovin leader, replaced Kljuic as party leader (Woodward 1995: 194). The radical faction gained effective control of the party in late 1991 and proclaimed on November 18, 1991, the ‘Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna’ as an economically and politically autonomous entity. Autonomy was, however, not the actual goal: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has concluded that the intention was to secede from Bosnia and become part of a ‘Greater Croatia’. At the time, Croatia had been independent, thus we code an irredentist declaration. [1991: irredentist declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The movement turned violent soon after Bosnia’s independence. But under the header of Yugoslavia, the movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Since 1946, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia and the Croatians had been recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. However, in the initial years of Yugoslavia’s existence, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s administration was dominated by the local Serbs.
* In the late 1960s/1970s, Yugoslavia was decentralized. In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). With the 1971 constitutional reforms and the 1974 constitution Yugoslavia became ever more decentralized (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000; Hamourtziadou 2002: 147). Critically, the 1974 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples in the republican administration and the party (Bieber & Keil 2009).
* In 1991, Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia which sparked the Bosnian Croat movement.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* There were numerous peace initiatives in the context of the Bosnian civil war. The Carrington-Cutileiro plan was negotiated while Bosnia was still part of Yugoslavia, thus it is coded under the header of Yugoslavia. In addition, in late June 1991 there was a proposal by Bosnian Muslims to divide Bosnia into three entities, a Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian block. We do not code a concession because the plan/initiative did not exceed proposal or negotiation stage.
* In early 1992, an EC-sponsored peace plan (the Carrington-Cutileiro plan) proposed the establishment of a loose federation, whereby significant powers would be transferred to the district level. Each district would be classified as Muslim, Serbian or Croat, even if no ethnic group was in the majority. March 18, 1992, all three sides (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) signed the agreement (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Radha 2007).
* Only ten days after the signing of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, the Bosnian president, Izbetgovic, withdrew his signature and declared his opposition to any type of division of Bosnia (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Radha 2007). Izbetgovic argued that he had been forced to sign the agreement because the EC had made his agreement a precondition for diplomatic recognition. However, according to Goodby (1996: 510-511), the main cause for Izbetgovic’s backtracking was the lack of U.S. support for the proposal. The U.S. was against the division of Bosnia because of the precedent this would set in terms of the feasibility of violent border changes. We do not code a concession or restriction due to the lack of implementation.

**Regional autonomy**

* The 1974 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples in the republican administration and the party (Bieber & Keil 2009). However, the Croats are the smallest of the three main communities in Bosnia; therefore we only code regional autonomy from 1992 due to the proclamation of the de facto independent Croat Herzeg-Bosa in late 1991. [1992: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* Herzeg-Bosna was proclaimed in late 1991. The local Croats began to engage in ethnic cleansing. The entity functioned as a de-facto independent state (even if it never formally declared independence; the 1991 proclamation spoke of an autonomous entity within Bosnia – but the ICTY has ruled that the actual intention was to merge with Croatia). “The de-facto entity adopted the Croatian currency, state symbol and educational curriculum, and it moreover implemented a policy of persecution against the Bosniak population” (Caspersen n.d.). Herzeg-Bosna was formally reintegrated into Bosnia after the 1994 Washington Agreement. Yet the institutions of the Federation have only been introduced slowly and under strong international pressure. According to Caspersen (n.d.): “although ‘Herceg-Bosna’ had officially ceased to exist in 1994, when the Washington Agreement was signed, a de facto Croat entity continued to exist” (also see International Crisis Group 1998: 3). Thus, de-facto independence did not end in 1994. We peg the end of de-facto independence in 1995 since according to Caspersen (n.d.): “[a]t Dayton, the Bosniak-Croat Federation was reaffirmed: the Croats abandoned their separate entity, Herceg-Bosnia, at least for the foreseeable period, and the Bosniaks agreed to equal representation and to devolution of power” (also see Bieber 2002: 211). It has to be noted though that the Croats continued to maintain “parallel” structures. [1992: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* Herzeg-Bosna was proclaimed in late 1991. The local Croats began to engage in ethnic cleansing. The entity functioned as a de-facto independent state (even if it never formally declared independence; the 1991 proclamation spoke of an autonomous entity within Bosnia – but the ICTY has ruled that the actual intention was to merge with Croatia). “The de-facto entity adopted the Croatian currency, state symbol and educational curriculum, and it moreover implemented a policy of persecution against the Bosniak population” (Caspersen n.d.). Herzeg-Bosna was formally reintegrated into Bosnia after the 1994 Washington Agreement. Yet the institutions of the Federation have only been introduced slowly and under strong international pressure. According to Caspersen (n.d.): “although ‘Herceg-Bosna’ had officially ceased to exist in 1994, when the Washington Agreement was signed, a de facto Croat entity continued to exist” (also see International Crisis Group 1998: 3). Thus, de-facto independence did not end in 1994. We peg the end of de-facto independence in 1995 since according to Caspersen (n.d.): “[a]t Dayton, the Bosniak-Croat Federation was reaffirmed: the Croats abandoned their separate entity, Herceg-Bosnia, at least for the foreseeable period, and the Bosniaks agreed to equal representation and to devolution of power” (also see Bieber 2002: 211). It has to be noted though that the Croats continued to maintain “parallel” structures. [1991: establishment of de-facto independence]
* Bosnia attained independence in 1992, implying a host change for the Bosnian Croats. [1992: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bosnian Croats |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Croats |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34502000 |

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Croats as senior partner in 1991 and as discriminated in 1992. We code the Bosnian Croats as discriminated in both years since EPR’s 1991 code refers to the situation before Croatia’s secession, and the movement only emerged thereafter. [1991-1992: discriminated]

**Group size**

* According to the 1991 census, there were 758,136 Croats in Bosnia. By the time the Bosnian Croat movement had emerged, Croatia, Slovenia and (arguably) Macedonia were independent. Thus Yugoslavia’s population was: its total population in the 1991 census – Croatia – Slovenia – Macedonia (14,498,262). [0.0523]

**Regional concentration**

* The Croats form a minority in Bosnia. According to the 1981 census, there were 758,000 Croats in BiH (18.4% of total population). This share decreased in the 1991 census: 761,000 Croats in Bosnia, 17.4% of the total population.
* BiH is famous for its checkered ethnic geography, and the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) live in varying proportions throughout the country. Larger concentrations can be found in southwestern Bosnia and northern Bosnia.
* Taking today’s administrative units as reference point, most Croats lived in parts of today’s Federation of BiH (approx. 78% in 1991, see Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 20). According to data from the 1991 census, the Croats made up an absolute majority in three of the Federation’s 10 cantons: Posavski, West Hercegovina, and canton 10. Only 25% of all Bosnian Croats lived in these three cantons, and while canton 10 and West Herzegovina are contiguous (both in southwestern Bosnia), Posavino lies at the other end of BiH. Out of the remaining seven cantons, one has a Croat plurality (Herzegovina Neretva, 41% Croats) in the 1991 census, and one a very significant Croat minority (Central Bosnia, 39% Croats) (Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 21). These two cantons are contiguous to canton 10 and West Herzegovina; if the four cantons are combined, we get a territory in which 51% of all Bosnian Croats lived and the Croats made up 48% of the local population. This is below the threshold for territorial concentration, yet only very marginally.
* Given that it is so close, we accessed district (municipality) level census data from the 1991 census. We found that the Bosnian Croats can be considered spatially concentrated, if only very marginally. [concentrated]
  + We found that the Croats formed an absolute majority in 14 municipalities, a plurality in another 8 municipalities, and a significant majority (> approx. 30%) in another 9 municipalities. Most municipalities lie in the country’s southwestern part and form an adjacent area (5/45 are non-adjacent and lie in the country’s northern part). 53% of all Bosnian Croats reside in the area, and the Croats make up 51% of the local population.
  + For the detailed census figures see below. Note that we counted Sarajevo as one municipality, while in the census it is counted as 10. Total number of municipalities was thus 100.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Total** | **Croats** | **% Croats** |
| **Southwestern Bosnia** | |  |  |
| **Absolute majority** | |  |  |
| Grude | 16358 | 16210 | 99.1% |
| Posušje | 17134 | 16963 | 99.0% |
| Široki Brijeg | 27160 | 26864 | 98.9% |
| Čitluk | 15083 | 14823 | 98.3% |
| Ljubuški | 28340 | 26127 | 92.2% |
| Neum | 4325 | 3792 | 87.7% |
| Tomislavgrad | 30009 | 25976 | 86.6% |
| Livno | 40600 | 29324 | 72.2% |
| Kreševo | 6731 | 4714 | 70.0% |
| Prozor | 19760 | 12259 | 62.0% |
| Čapljina | 27882 | 14969 | 53.7% |
| Kiseljak | 24164 | 12550 | 51.9% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Relative majority** | |  |  |
| Fojnica | 16296 | 8024 | 49.2% |
| Busovača | 18879 | 9093 | 48.2% |
| Vitez | 27859 | 12675 | 45.5% |
| Vareš | 22203 | 9016 | 40.6% |
| Novi Travnik | 30713 | 12162 | 39.6% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Municipalities with significant Croat minority** | | | |
| Gornji Vakuf | 25181 | 10706 | 42.5% |
| Kupres | 9618 | 3813 | 39.6% |
| Žepče | 22966 | 9100 | 39.6% |
| Travnik | 70747 | 26118 | 36.9% |
| Jajce | 45007 | 15811 | 35.1% |
| Bugojno | 46889 | 16031 | 34.2% |
| Mostar | 126628 | 43037 | 34.0% |
| Stolac | 18681 | 6188 | 33.1% |
| Kakanj | 55950 | 16556 | 29.6% |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Northern Bosnia** | |  |  |
| Orašje | 28367 | 21308 | 75.1% |
| Odžak | 30056 | 16338 | 54.4% |
| Bosanski Šamac | 32960 | 14731 | 44.7% |
| Bosanski Brod | 34138 | 13993 | 41.0% |
| Derventa | 56489 | 22952 | 40.6% |

**Kin**

* The Croats in Croatia form numerically significant kin (EPR). Since Croatia had effectively been independent when the Bosnian Croat movement emerged, we code kin in adjoining country with 1 also in 1991. [kin in neighboring country]

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## Bosnian Serbs

Activity: 1991-1992

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Serb Democratic Party was established in Bosnia in 1990 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 150). In spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159), thus the start date. In November 1991, a referendum was organized in the Serbian part of Bosnia on a merger with Serbia. The movement continued to be active in Bosnia. [start date: 1991; end date: host change (1992)]

**Dominant claim**

* The Serb Democratic Party was established in Bosnia in 1990 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 150). In spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159). In November 1991, a referendum was organized in the Serbian part of Bosnia on a merger with Serbia. The intention appears to have been to separate from Bosnia from the time of the movement’s inception. [1991-1992: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Bosnian Serbs corresponds roughly to today’s Republika Srpska, which consists of scattered Serbian Autonomous Oblasts (SAO) such as the SAO of Bosanska Krajina, the SAO of Romanija, the SAO of NorthEastern Bosnia and the SAO of Herzegovina (Roth 2015: 140). We code this claim according to Roth (2015: 137).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In a repetition of the Krajina strategy, in spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159). We code a sub-state secession declaration since the intention from the movement’s inception was for a merger with Serbia. [1991: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Fighting between Serbs (including from Croatia and Serbia proper) had spilled over into Bosnia prior to Bosnia’s independence. According to the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, violence flared up in early March 1992, thus shortly after the Bosnian independence referendum of February 29/March 1 and subsequent independence declaration. According to Correlates of War (Russet et al. 1968; Sarkees & Wayman 2010), Bosnia’s date of recognized independence is April 7, 1992 while Gleditsch & Ward (1999) peg the date of independence to April 27, 1992. The UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 22.1 reports a total 35 battle-related deaths between April 13 and 26, 1992, with deaths on both sides (Sundberg & Melander 2013). The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia reports additional deaths in March 1992: “On 3 March, fighting between Serbian militia and Bosnian police in the northern Bosnia-Herzegovina town of Bosanski Brod resulted in several deaths.” Based on this, 1992 is coded as LVIOLSD. Violence escalated markedly after independence, which was perceived by the Serbs as a violation of their rights and an uneven application of the right to self-determination. [1991: NVIOLSD; 1992: LVIOLSD (escalating to HVIOLSD in independent Bosnia)]

**Historical context**

* Since 1946, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia and the Serbs had been recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. In the initial years, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s administration was dominated by the local Serbs.
* In the late 1960s/1970s, Yugoslavia was decentralized. In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). With the 1971 constitutional reforms and the 1974 constitution Yugoslavia became ever more decentralized (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000; Hamourtziadou 2002: 147). Yet the Bosnian Serbs lost their dominant status within Bosnia: the 1974 constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresaw a strict system of proportional representation of all three peoples in the republican administration and the party (Bieber & Keil 2009).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* There were numerous peace initiatives in the context of the Bosnian civil war. The Carrington-Cutileiro plan was negotiated while Bosnia was still part of Yugoslavia, thus it is coded under the header of Yugoslavia. In addition, in late June 1991 there was a proposal by Bosnian Muslims to divide Bosnia into three entities, a Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian block. We do not code a concession because the plan/initiative did not exceed proposal or negotiation stage.
* In early 1992, an EC-sponsored peace plan (the Carrington-Cutileiro plan) proposed the establishment of a loose federation, whereby significant powers would be transferred to the district level. Each district would be classified as Muslim, Serbian or Croat, even if no ethnic group was in the majority. March 18, 1992, all three sides (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) signed the agreement (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Radha 2007).
* Only ten days after the signing of the Carrington-Cutileiro plan, the Bosnian president, Izbetgovic, withdrew his signature and declared his opposition to any type of division of Bosnia (Goodby 1996: 510; Kumar & Radha 2007). Izbetgovic argued that he had been forced to sign the agreement because the EC had made his agreement a precondition for diplomatic recognition. However, according to Goodby (1996: 510-511), the main cause for Izbetgovic’s backtracking was the lack of U.S. support for the proposal. The U.S. was against the division of Bosnia because of the precedent this would set in terms of the feasibility of violent border changes. We do not code a concession or restriction due to the lack of implementation.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Bosnian Serbs participated in Bosnia’s regional government and, as of late 1991, had their own de-facto entity. [1991-1992: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* In a repetition of the Krajina strategy, in spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159; Bose n.d.). [1992: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* In a repetition of the Krajina strategy, in spring 1991 the SDP set up “Serbian Autonomous Regions” in Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia and declared them no longer under the authority of the republican government (Gagnon 1994: 159; Bose n.d.). [1991: establishment of de-facto independence]
* Bosnia attained independence in 1992, implying a host change for the Bosnian Serbs. [1992: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Bosnian Serbs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Serbs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34501000 |

**Power access**

* Part of EPR’s ‘Serbs’. At the time, Yugoslavia’s executive consisted of eight members, one from each republic/autonomous republic. From 1989-1991 Bosnia’s seat was held by an ethnic Serb, Bogic Bogicevic. After the secession of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia in 1991, the Serbs (together with the Montenegrins) monopolized power under the Milosevic regime and the presidency was abolished. Thus we retain the junior partner code for 1992. [1991-1992: junior partner]

**Group size**

* According to the 1991 census, Serbs made up 31.2% of Bosnia’s population of 4,377,033. Yugoslavia’s total population was 23,229,846 in the 1991 census. [1991: 0.0588]
* By 1992, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia were independent. Thus Yugoslavia’s population was: its total population in the 1991 census – Croatia – Slovenia – Macedonia (14,498,262). [1992: 0.0942]

**Regional concentration**

* The Serbs form a minority in Bosnia. According to the 1981 census, there were 1.32 million Serbs in BiH (32% of total population). This share decreased slightly in the 1991 census: 1.367 million Serbs in Bosnia, 31.2% of the total population.
* BiH is famous for its checkered ethnic geography, and the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) live in varying proportions throughout the country. Larger concentrations of Serbs could be found in Bosnia’s west, northwest, and south (MAR). Nevertheless, a spatially contiguous exists that crosses the threshold for spatial concentration: today’s Republika Srpska. Data from the 1991 census shows that 64% of all Serbs in Bosnia resided in what would later become the Republika Srpska, and that the Serbs made up a (relatively narrow) absolute majority there (55.4%). Critically, Republika Srpska is not spatially contiguous, but separated into two by Brcko district, a multi-ethnic entity in northeastern Bosnia. In the 1991 census, the Serbs made up 21% of the district, Croats 25%, and Bosniaks 44%. If Brcko is added to the Republica Srpska, we get a spatially contiguous territory in which 65% of all Bosnian Serbs lived and the Serbs made up 54% of the local population (Federal Statistics Office, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008: 20). [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR, there is kin (i.e. Serbs) in a number of other countries, in particular Serbia and Croatia, but also Slovenia, Macedonia, and (from 2006) Montenegro as well as (from 2008) Kosovo. MAR also notes the same kin. However, this applies only to the period after Croatia’s secession. There were also large Serbian populations in places like Germany and Austria. We do not code this due to the non-permanent status of the foreign workers (they had to return after a while). [1991: no kin; 1992: kin in adjoining country]

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## Croatian Serbs

Activity: 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Following an economic and political crisis in Yugoslavia that made it clear that the federal republic could no longer stay united, and after an upsurge of Croatian nationalism aimed at securing Croatia independence, Serbs in Croatia agitated for autonomy from an independent Croatian state.
* Huszka (2014: 71) reports that the Croatian Serbs stepped up their demands for political autonomy in 1989 and that the Milosevic regime orchestrated the first Serbian demonstration in the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia in July 1989, thus the start date.
* In February 1990, the Serb Democratic Party (Croatia) was founded, which advocated the merger of Serbian territories in Croatia with Serbia.
* In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. The so-called Log Revolution ensued: Serbs erected barricades on important roads in opposition.
* In March 1991 the Krajina Oblast together with other unilaterally declared Croatian Serb Autonomous Oblasts that had been formed in the meantime (the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem and the SAO Western Slavonia) declared their secession from Croatia.
* The movement remained active after Croatia’s secession in 1991 (Gurr 2000; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 76f, 116, 161, 190ff, 270; Hewitt et al. 2008; Huska 2014; Marshall & Gurr 2003, 2005; MAR; Sambanis & Shayo 2013; Samostalna Demokratska Srpska Stranka). [start date: 1989; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* Initially the Croatian Serbs lobbied for self-determination within Yugoslavia. Soon the claim escalated to secession, but this is coded under the banner of Croatia. However, it is not entirely clear whether the dominant claim was for an autonomous status within the Croatian Republic, for the set-up of their own republic within Yugoslavia or for a merger with the Serb republic. The 1990 referendum was on unspecified autonomy, and so was the 1990 declaration. The de-facto independent entity set up in 1990 was declared an autonomous oblast. From Gagnon (1994: 159) it appears that the autonomous oblast was declared “no longer under the authority of the republican government”. Huszka (2014: 71) notes that the Serbs demanded autonomy, but also notes that the Croatian Serb campaign was widely seen (in Croatia/by Croats) as geared towards separation from the Croatian Republic. MAR argues that the Serbs wanted their areas joined with the Serbian Republic: “when it began to appear that Yugoslavia was about to dissolve in the late 1980s, Serbs in Croatia began to protest to have their areas joined with those of other Serbs in Yugoslavia as a whole.” According to Stojanovic (1995: 345), when Croatian claims for independence from Yugoslavia became more concrete in 1990, the Serbs in Croatia immediately declared that they do not want to secede from Yugoslavia, but on the contrary, would secede from Croatia if Croatia became independent, in order to join the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, which they considered their homeland. We code the more radical claim throughout. [1989-1991: sub-state secession claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Croatian Serbs consists of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina and the Oblasts of Eastern Slavonia and Western Slavonia. We code this claim based on Roth (2015: 137).

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On July 25, 1990, the Serbian National Council was founded in Knin and it decided to organize a referendum on the autonomy of the Serbian Krajina in August (Grandits and Leutloff 2003: 30). On August 18, 1990, the Serbs in Croatia held a referendum on autonomy in Croatia (Meier 1999) (known as Kraijna referendum). The Croat authorities declared this referendum as illegal. The vast majority of Serbs voted in favor of Serbian self-rule. Also in summer 1990, the so-called Log Revolution (Balvan revolucija) took place, where the Serbs established barricades of logs on important roads in order to express their secession from Croatia. On October 1, 1990, the Serbian National Council in Knin, presided by Milan Babic, declared the autonomy over the regions under their control (Grandits and Leutloff 2003: 36). Consequently, the Croatian Serbs founded the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (Krajina SAO) that consisted of municipalities with a Serbian majority on December 21, 1990. We code a sub-state secession declaration since the intention from the movement’s inception was for a merger with Serbia. [1990: sub-state secession declaration]
* On February 28, 1991, the Republic of Serbian Krajina declared its independence form Croatia (Grandits and Leutloff 2003: 36). Arguably, the goal was to merge with Serbia: on May 12, 1991, another referendum was held, where the majority of the Croatian Serbs supported the unification of their territories with Serbia (Gagnon 1994: 159). [1991: sub-state secession declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* Croatian Serbs participated in the war between Yugoslavia and Croatia, yet separatist violence erupted only after Croatia’s secession in late 1991. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* In 1941 Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia and established a puppet Croatian ‘Ustasha’ state. Under the Ustasha regime, the Croatian Serbs were severely discriminated against (Minority Rights Group International).
* After the war, Croatia was integrated into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as one of six federal republics. The Croatian Serbs were not granted autonomy, but the Serbs were recognized as one of five constituent nationalities.
* During Yugoslav times, Serbs in Croatia were overrepresented in the government and public administration. For instance, although constituting 12 percent of the population of Croatia, the Serbs made up 50 percent of the police in Croatia in 1984 (Stulhofer 1993).
* In the late 1960s/early 1970s, Yugoslavia underwent rapid decentralization. Thus Croatia gained increased autonomy (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000). However, the decentralization reforms were directed mainly at the republics’ constituent nations (Croatians in Croatia etc.).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* “By the end of 1989, reformist forces had taken over the Croatian party, and both the Slovene and Croatian parties had scheduled multi-party elections for the spring of 1990” (Gagnon 1994: 152). In 1990, Croatia enacted two amendment packages to the constitution of the Socialist Croatian Republic. First, in January 1990, it legalized multi-party elections. Second, it dropped communist and Yugoslav symbols, language and the Cyrillic script in July 1990 (Widner 2004). Thus, the Croatian authorities no longer promoted the use of the Serbian language. Furthermore, “[i]n December 1990 the Croatian government promulgated a new constitution proclaiming Croatia the state of the Croat nation (thereby demoting the Croatian Serbs, formerly a constituent nation, to minority status)” (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147; also see Hayden 1992: 657; Stojanovic 1995: 345-346; Minority Rights Group International). “The Republic of Croatia is established as the nation state of the Croatian nation and state of members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs...“ (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 1990: 2). [1990: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

* Due to the establishment of de-facto independence in 1990. [1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

* In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. As of summer 1990, the Croatian authorities lost control over the municipalities with a Serb majority (see e.g. Grandits and Leutloff 2003). [1991: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* In October 1990 the Croatian Serbs unilaterally declared an autonomous entity within Croatia, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina. As of summer 1990, the Croatian authorities lost control over the municipalities with a Serb majority (see e.g. Grandits and Leutloff 2003). [1990: establishment of de-facto independent entity]
* Croatia attained independence in late 1991, implying a host change for the Croatian Serbs. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Croatian Serbs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Serbs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34501000 |

**Power access**

* Part of EPR’s ‘Serbs’. At the time, Yugoslavia’s executive consisted of eight members, one from each republic/autonomous republic. The Croat seat went to Croats, thus the Croatian Serbs had no direct representation and we code them as powerless. Note though that the Serbs (i.e., Milosevic’s) had a very strong position within Yugoslavia. [1989-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to the 1991 census, Serbs made up 12.2% of Croatia’s population of 4,784,265 (Minority Rights Group International). Yugoslavia’s total population was 23,229,846 in the 1991 census. [0.0251]

**Regional concentration**

* Based on the information we found, the Croatian Serbs cannot be considered concentrated before the war. Until the war, there were large populations of Serbs living in the Krajina region as well as in Eastern Slavonia. The 1991 census counted 581,663 Serbs in Croatia. Based on data from the ICTY, the Krajina region included approx. 250,000 Serbs and the Serbs made up a bare majority there (52%). Another 60,000 lived in Eastern Slavonia, but there the Serbs were in a minority (approx. 30%). Krajina and Eastern Slavonia are not spatially contiguous. The remaining Serbs lived scattered throughout Croatia. Although it is close, the Krajina region (the only region where Serbs comprised the majority) did not include the majority of the Serbs. [not concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR, there is kin in a number of other countries, in particular Serbia and BiH, but also Slovenia, Macedonia, and (from 2006) Montenegro as well as (from 2008) Kosovo. MAR also notes the same kin. However, this applies only to the period after Croatia’s secession. Before 1991, there were also large Serbian populations in places like Germany and Austria. We do not code this due to the non-permanent status of the foreign workers (they had to return after a while). [no kin]

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## Croats

Activity: 1967-1972; 1989-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1967, a multisided movement among Croatian politicians, independent intellectuals, church groups, and cultural associations – merging into what became identified as a nationalist mass movement (MASPOK – the “Croatian Spring”) – pressured for more autonomy, specifically for Croatian rights and greater control of its economic resources and foreign affairs. We therefore peg the start date of the movement at 1967. The movement was suppressed in early 1972 (Radan 2002: 174; Cohen 1993: 81; Stojanovic 1995: 344; Silber and Little 1995: 82). We thus code the end of the first (non-violent) phase as 1972. [start date 1: 1967; end date 1: 1972]
* In 1989, when independence-minded Franjo Tudjman founded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Croat movement re-erupted (HDZ 2013; Silber & Little 1995: 83). In 1991 Croatia was recognized as an international state, hence the end of the movement. [start date 2: 1989; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* The core demand during the Croatian Spring, which began shortly after Aleksandr Rankovic’s fall, was for increased political and economic autonomy (Benson 2004: 123). [1967-1972: autonomy claim]
* The core organization associated with the Croat movement, the HDZ, began to mobilize for Croat independence immediately after it was founded in 1989 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 146). In 1990, after the nationalist opposition had taken over power, Slovenia and Croatia issued a joint document proposing a Yugoslav Confederation composed of sovereign and independent republics (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147). Also in 1990, the Croatian parliament amended the Croatian Constitution declaring “political and economic sovereignty over Croatian territory” (Woodward 1995: 120). The Croatian referendum in May 1991 supported full independence. We code an independence claim throughout the second phase. [1989-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1989; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The dominant territorial claim related to present-day Croatia, previously the Socialist Republic of Croatia (Roth 2015: 137), but Franco Tudjman started to make more expansive claims that included areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on the historical borders of the Banovina of Croatia (Magas & Zanic 2013). As the latter claim was made after Croatia became independent and extends beyond Croatia’s borders, we restrict our coding to the former claim, relying on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* On June 25, 1991, on the same day as Slovenia, the [Croatian Parliament](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_Parliament) declared independence from Yugoslavia (Iglar 1992). [1991: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The HVIOLSD code in 1991 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). [1967-1972, 1989-1990: NVIOLSD; 1991: HVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + Since 1946, Croatia had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia. After Slovenia, Croatia was the second wealthiest republic (Iglar 1992: 233). The 1953 constitution led to significant decentralization in the economic realm. Despite significant conservative resistances, the country underwent major reforms, including economic reforms that started in 1964/1965 to introduce a market economy, and the democratization of the [League of Communists of Yugoslavia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Communists_of_Yugoslavia) between 1966 and 1969, which led to giving a larger role to the Leagues of Communists of each individual republic and province (Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984). [1966: autonomy concession]
* 2nd phase:
  + As a result of the Croatian Spring, Yugoslavia was decentralized with the 1969 and 1971 constitutional reforms. Furthermore, the new Yugoslav Constitution that was ratified in 1974 increased the autonomy of the federal republics and regions (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000). We identified no concession or restriction in the ten years before the second start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted six amendments to the 1963 Constitution on April 19, 1967, which inter alia considerably increased the powers of the Council of Nationalities and abolished the offices of Vice-President of the Republic and Deputy Supreme Commander. The enlargement of the powers of the Council of Nationalities was accordingly designed to ensure that Federal legislation respected the equal rights of all regions and did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Republics (Keesing’s Record of World Events: May 1967). Note: the amendments were passed in April while the Croatian Spring had started in March 1967. [1967: autonomy concession]
* In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). [1969: autonomy concession]
* After several months of intense and often embittered controversy, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted on June 30, 1971, a series of amendments to the Constitution which limited the powers of the Federal Government to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade and the unity of the economic and social system, all other matters falling within the authority of the six Republics composing the Federation. The amendments also established a Presidency of 22 members in which all the Republics were equally represented (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971). [1971: autonomy concession]
* Croatia declared independence in June 1991 (see below). The Yugoslav Constitutional Court declared the declaration illegal in November 1991 (Radan 2002: 177). Croatia proceeded on its path to independence, and the first recognition trickled in late 1991: Germany recognized Croatian independence on December 19, 1991. January 15, 1992, the EC Council of Ministers recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 148). However, there was strong (and violent) opposition to Croatian independence from the Yugoslav and the Serbian side. Thus we do not code a concession on independence. It can be argued that Milosevic eventually came to terms with Croatia’s secession, though continuing to insist on the Croatian Serbs’ recursive right to secession from Croatia. But this came only after Croatia’s internationally recognized independence in late 1991.

**Regional autonomy**

* Although, until the early 1970s, Croatia’s autonomy was limited compared to the situation after the 1974 constitution, the Croats still had some meaningful autonomy (Bertsch 1977; Denitch 1977). [1967-1972: regional autonomy]
* With the 1974 constitution, the autonomy of the Croats increased substantially (see above); hence we also code autonomy for the second phase. [1989-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]
* A significant part of the Croats remained in Yugoslavia and became part of Bosnia in 1992. As this movement is coded only until and including 1991, this host change is not reflected here.

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Croats |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Croats |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34502000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.2]

**Regional concentration**

* The Croats formed a majority (>50%) of the Croat republic throughout the period of activity, where also a majority of Croats lived. For example, according to the 1981 census, 78% of the 4.428 million Croats lived in Croatia, where the Croats made up 75% of the population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR does not code transnational kin during the period of activity, and nor does MAR. [no kin]

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## Hungarians

Activity: 1992-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Hungarians in Vojvodina are represented by both cultural organizations and political parties.
* The main organization, which has been consistently active throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, is the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DCHV), founded in 1989. The DCHV first proposed wide-ranging autonomy for Vjovodina in 1992, hence the start date of the movement.
* Other groups include the Hungarians for the Fatherland, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, the political party the Democratic Alliance for Reform of Vojvodina, and the Vojvodina Movement (see Vojvodina Serbs). The group also relies on both the Hungarian government and external Hungarian organizations, such as the World Congress of Hungarians, to pressure the Yugoslav government on their behalf.
* The majority of the organizations representing the Hungarians have been calling for greater autonomy for the Vojvodina region, while others have advocated a Hungarian-only region in northern Vojvodina.
* In recent years, the Yugoslav government has given additional powers to the Vojvodina region in areas such as education, there has been little enthusiasm for granting the region the level oautonomy wanted by the Hungarians.
* There is evidence of continued activity (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 124f, 325f; Keesing’s; Marshall & Gurr 2003; MAR; Balkan Insight 2013). [start date: 1992; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* In 1992 the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DCHV/VDMK) published a proposal demanding wide autonomy rights for the Hungarians (Fox 1996; VDMK 2014).Hungarian organizations continued to lobby for increased autonomy in subsequent years. In 2002, Vojvodina regained many of the competencies it had lost when its autonomy was revoked in 1990. Many Hungarians continued to make claims for increased autonomy (Minority Rights Group International; Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 2022). There also been calls for the establishment of an autonomous Hungarian region separate from Vojvodina, though Stroschein (n.d.) suggests that most Hungarians support the idea of having a Vojvodina region with yet increased autonomy. Some Serbian media outlets have argued that there is an irredentist threat due to the Hungarians in Vojvodina, but union with Hungary is certainly not the movement’s dominant claim (Waters 2000). Calls for merging the region with Hungary have mainly come from nationalists based in Hungary rather than in Vojvodina. Based on this, we code a claim for autonomy throughout. [1992-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by Hungarians consists of the Vojvodina region, where the vast majority of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia settle. The territory is shown in Roth (2015: 137) and corresponds to the current Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* At the end of 1995, several opposition groups published the “Manifesto of Vojvodina”. The manifesto was signed in May 1996 by a total of seventeen political organizations, including Hungarian ones (Briza 1995). The manifesto demanded autonomy for Vojvodina (Devetak 1997: 75) but did not unilaterally declare sovereignty. Thus no declaration is coded.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The 1971 constitutional amendments and the 1974 constitution gave the Vojvodina significant autonomy. Moreover, the Hungarian language was recognized (Fox 1996). However, in 1988, the members of the ethnically and religiously diverse provincial assembly of Vojvodina resigned and were replaced by Serbs who shared Milosevic’s irredentist ambitions in the wake of the anti-bureaucratic revolution. The anti-bureaucratic revolution is widely seen as orchestrated by Milosevic, who aimed to foster his control over the regions. It could be seen as a restriction, but we considered this too ambiguous to be coded.
* However, we code a cultural rights restriction because after the revolution, the use of the Hungarian language was phased out, and media leaders were replaced. [1988: cultural rights restriction]
* In 1989 Vojvodina’s autonomy was revoked. The 1990 constitution reiterated the revocation of autonomy (Fox 1996; Ristic 2010). [1989: autonomy restriction]
* In 1991 Serbia passed a law that made Serbian the official language throughout the country, including Vojvodina (Minorities at Risk Project). [1991: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The vast majority of Hungarians in Serbia (Yugoslavia) are concentrated in the north of the Vojvodina region, which was part of Hungary until 1920. While the Hungarians comprise only about 13 per cent of Vojvodina’s population, parts of the movement have called for increased autonomy for the Vojvodina region (while others have called for a Hungarian-only region in the north of Vojvodina). Despite their minority status within Vojvodina, the Hungarians have played a certain role in the region’s government (Minahan 2002: 2003); hence, changes in Vojvodina’s autonomy level directly affect the Hungarians, and are coded as concessions or restrictions.
* By way of the 2002 Omnibus Law, Vojvodina regained many of the competencies that it had lost when its autonomy was taken away in 1989 (Minority Rights Group International; Omnibus Zakon 2002). In particular, Vojvodina gained autonomy over cultural and economic affairs. Furthermore, the 2002 Omnibus Law provided for the re-establishment of Hungarian as one of the official languages in Vojvodina (Petsinis 2003). [2002: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession]
  + Furthermore, in March 2002, the Yugoslav parliament passed a law on national minorities. In particular, the law outlined the creation of a Federal Council of National Minorities, comprised of reprsentatives of the National Councils of each minority group, including the Hungarians. The councils are designed to protect minority languages, education, media, and culture (Stroschein n.d.). In particular, the law stipulates that national minorities can use their language within their municipality or locality if they form 15 per cent of the local population, as well as have education in their native language (Petsinis 2003). We (also) code an autonomy concession because the minority councils can be understood as a form of non-territorial autonomy (Korhecz n.d.).
* In 2006, Serbia adopted a new Constitution that further increased the autonomy of the Vojvodina province in terms of financial autonomy (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2006). [2006: autonomy concession]
* In 2009, the Serbian parliament adopted another minority law, which increased the competencies of the minority councils that were introduced back in 2002, and hence the cultural autonomy of Hungarians in Serbia (Kokai 2010: 6; OSCE 2010). Furthermore, on November 30, 2009, the Serbian Parliament ratified the Constitution/Statue of the autonomous province Vojvodina (that was drafted by the provincial parliament in 2008). The provincial Constitution came into force on January 1, 2010. The new constitution conferred additional autonomy upon Vojvodina, and thus comes closest to the autonomy rights that the Vojvodina had had before 1990 (Radio Free Europe 2009). [2009: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Vojvodina re-attained its autonomous status in 2002 (see above). The Hungarians play a certain role in the regional government, hence we code them as autonomous from 2003 onwads, following the first of January rule. [2003-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2002: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Hungarians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Hungarians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34511000 (until and including 2006); 34011000 (from 2007 onwards) |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [powerless]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1992-2006: 0.03; 2007-2008: 0.031; 2009-2020: 0.035]

**Regional concentration**

* The Hungarians in Yugoslavia are concentrated in the North of the Vojvodina region, bordering Hungary. According to MRGI, “most live in Vojvodina where they make up some 14 per cent of the population, and a majority in 8 municipalities.” According to MAR, more than 50% of Hungarians in Yugoslavia live in their “regional base.” Data from the 2011 census also suggests that the Hungarians can be considered spatially concentrated. They constitute an absolute majority in five districts (municipalities), and a relative majority in another three. The eight municipalities are spatially contiguous, and, if combined, 59% of Serbia’s 254,000 Hungarians reside there, and they make up a narrow absolute majority of 50.1% (see below for the figures by municipality). [concentrated]
  + Kanjiza: 85% out of 25,000
  + Senta: 79% out of 23,000
  + Ada: 75% out of 17,000
  + Backa Topola: 58% out of 33,000
  + Mali Idos: 54% out of 12,000
  + Coka: 49.7% out of 11,000
  + Becej: 46% out of 37,000
  + Subotica: 36% out of 141,000

**Kin**

* In neighboring Hungary, among others (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Istrians

Activity: 1990-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) was formed in 1990, one year before Croatian independence. According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the IDS advocated “increased autonomy for Istria”. The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013). Although the party did not participate in the first multi-party elections of 1990, it seems there was some separatist activity prior to Croatian independence. 1990 is thus coded as start date. The Istrian movement remained active when Croatia gained independence in 1991 (see Istrians under Croatia). [start date: 1990; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* According to Ashbrook (2006: 638), the IDS worked “toward the regionalization of Croatia and securing increased autonomy for Istria within a democratic Croatian state.” The autonomy claim is confirmed by Minahan (2002: 817), Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 139) and Beovic (2013). [1990-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Istrians demanded more autonomy within their homeland in Yugoslavia, which included present-day Istria Counta, as well as parts of south-western Slovenia, which correspond to the present-day municipalities of Koper, Izola, Piran, and Hrpelje-Kozina (Roth 2015: 136). We code this claim based on the map shown in Roth (2015: 137), using GIS data on administrative units from the Global Administrative Areas database for polygon definition.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* There is no evidence of separatist violence. Hence, the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* After centuries of divisions and shifting borders, the Istrian peninsula was divided between the state of Venetia and Austria. The northwestern districts became part of the Venetian state, the southeastern districts were under Habsburg control and became a separate crownland in the Ausrian Empire. The northern districts were also passed to Austria in 1797 with the Treaty of Campoformio and – apart from a short French rule under Napoleon between 1805 and 1813 – remained a Habsburg possession until 1918 (Minahan 2002: 815; Ashbrook 2006: 622).
* After the First World War and the defeat of the Habsburg Empire, Trieste and the Istrian peninsula were awarded to Italy (Hewitt and Cheetham 2000: 299). The region was placed under Italian administration in 1920 and with the fascist takeover in 1922, a policy of denationalization and Italianization was initiated. Slav languages were banned in 1926 and immigration from southern Italy was supported (Minahan 2002: 816; Beovic 2013: 29).
* After the Second World War, the Istrian territory was contested by Tito’s Yugoslavia and Italy. Apart from the city of Trieste and the surrounding Muggia, the Istrian peninsula fell to Yugoslavia. This meant considerably better protection of cultural rights for the Slovenes and Croats if compared to Mussolini’s fascist Italy (e.g. Bertsch 1977; Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984), but at the same time Italians were suppressed. Between 1943 and 1960 there was a massive exodus of the Italian population.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1989, reformist Croatian-nationalist forces took over the Croatian government (Gagnon 1994: 152). According to Minahan (2002: 817), “[t]he new Croatian government, under a resolutely nationalist administration, began to limit local government autonomy, passing laws that threatened Istrian culture.” Since we do not code changes in municipal autonomy, we do not code an autonomy restriction. However, basing on Minahan (“threatened Istrian culture”) we code a cultural rights restriction, pegging it to 1990, the year the highly nationalist Croatian constitution was promulgated (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147; also see Hayden 1992: 657; Stojanovic 1995: 345-346; Minority Rights Group International). The constitution was adopted in December 1990 while IDS was formed in February 1990, thus we treat this as a restriction post-movement emergence. [1990: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Croatia and Slovenia both attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Istrians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Croats; Slovenes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34502000; 34507000 |

**Power access**

* According to EPR, the relevant ethnic groups on the Istrian peninsula were the Croats and the Slovenes. The Italian minority, of which a large share emigrated between 1943 and 1960, is not considered relevant by EPR. Both Croats and Slovenes are coded as junior partner (until and including 1966) and then senior partner. However, we do not adopt this coding for two reasons. First, the Istrians only made up a small share of the Croat/Slovenian population. Second, there is also a multi-ethnic Istrian identity – although heavily disputed and politicized – that has developed since the Second World War and that is separate from the Croatian, Slovenian or Italian identities. If we measure access to political power along the lines of this Istrian identity, the Istrians are best seen as powerless: we found no evidence of executive representation. [1990-1991: powerless]

**Group size**

* According to Minahan (1998, 2002) there are Istrians in both Slovenia and Croatia. Minahan gives conflicting information on the number of Istrians in these two countries. According to Minahan (2002), the total number is 412,000 (this figure includes some Istrians in Italy), while according to Minahan (1998) there are 245,000 in Croatia and 37,000 in Slovenia. These figures are incompatible as they suggest that there are approx. 130,000 Istrians in Italy while Minahan (2002: 813) suggests that the Italian Istrian community is not that large. We decided to stick to Minahan (1998) to have a consistent figure – we need disaggregated data on the number of Istrians in Croatia as they are coded in both Yugoslavia and, after Croatia’s secession, in Croatia. Thus we use the combination of Istrians in Slovenia and Croatia (282,000) in combination with Yugoslavia’s total population in the 1991 census 23,229,846. [0.0121]

**Regional concentration**

* From Minahan (2002: 813) we can conclude that the majority of the Istrians lives in Istria and that they form an absolute majority there. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Istrians in Italy, but there number is too low (Minahan 2002). [no kin]

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## Kosovar Albanians

Activity: 1945-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* From about 1200 to 1455 Kosovo was part of the Serbian kingdom. In 1455 Kosovo fell to the Ottomans. Kosovo had been under Ottoman rule since 1455, when, in 1912/1913, Kosovo was conquered and divided between Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria; the largest part went to Serbia and became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) after WWI. Kosovar resistance against Serbian rule emerged. In 1918, the Committee for the National Defense of Kosovo was formed and subsequently launched an armed struggle against Serbia. Self-government for Kosovo ranged among the aims of the committee. By the mid-1920s, the insurgency had been suppressed and given strong repression, organized activity for self-determination remained impossible until WWII (Elsie 2012: 93, 230; Clark 2000: 28-29).
* In 1941, the Axis powers invaded Yugoslavia. Kosovo was united with neighboring Albania under Italian control. Kosovar Albanians began to drive out and kill Serbs. Resistance against the occupation was relatively weak in Kosovo (Clark 2000: 29).
* In 1942, Balli Kombetar (BK) was formed. Initially, it was an Albanian resistance movement against the Italian unification of Italy, but the BK became openly collaborationist in 1943.
* In 1943 the Second League of Prizren was formed, a Kosovar offshoot of the BK. “[I]ts [the BK’s] activity in Kosovo was directed against Serbs with the goal of the Second League being to maintain the unification of Kosovo with Albania” (Clark 2000: 29).
* In 1944 Nazi Germany left. A national movement, combining BK members and Albanian partisans, began to resist (re-)incorporation into Yugoslavia in late December 1944 (Encyclopedia Britannica; Clark 2000: 30).
* We code the Kosovar Albanians from 1945 onwards, the first year we cover. However, we note prior activity. The start date is pegged to 1944, the year the insurrection against the incoming Yugoslav partisans began.
* Throughout the ensuing decades, illegal Kosovar self-determination movements continued to operate, generally clandestinely due to Serbian oppression, but with occasional uprisings (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 158ff, 249f, 325f; Jansen 2008; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 307ff, 2002: 1029ff; MAR; Robert 2012).
* In 2008, Kosovo declared unilateral independence. This was recognized by 101 states. Yet a small Albanian population has remained in Serbia, concentrated in the Presevo Valley, and there has been contention for a merger with Kosovo. For instance, in March 2014 the president of the Movement for Democratic Progress (PDP), an ethnic Albanian party, and simultaneously mayor of Bujanovac (a town in the Presevo Valley), argued that the Presevo Valley had always been part of Kosovo and that it had declared its wish to join Kosovo in an (unofficial) March 1992 referendum (Independent 2014; Novinite 2014; Civil War in Europe 2014). There is also talk about a potential land swap with Kosovo, whereby Serbia would give Kosovo the Presevo Valley in return for Serb-inhabited North Kosovo (Radio Free Europe 2010). There have been negotiations regarding the status of Presevo Valley for years without significant movement (Brzozowski and Taylor 2022). [start date: 1944; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Minahan (2002: 1031) suggests that Kosovo had been separated from Serbia by Italy and added to Italian-occupied Albania during WWII, and that Kosovar Albanians resisted re-incorporaton into Yugoslavia until 1946, when the movement was crushed (also see Encyclopedia Britannica). Yet, as Clark 2000: 11, 30f) explains, the Kosovar movement was suppressed already in 1945. [1945-1945: irredentist claim]
* Since the end of World War II, the Kosovar Albanians demanded autonomy rights within the Yugoslavian framework (Clark 2000: 37-41). Initially the national movement was small and badly organized. Independence was not seriously considered. Still the dominant claim (autonomy or sub-state secession) is not entirely clear. There was a claim for republican status at least since 1966 (after the ouster of Rankovic) (Maliqi 1996: 140). It appears likely that there were claims for sub-state secession already before that (the sources we consulted do not suggest that the claim had escalated from autonomy to sub-state secession). Tito’s death in 1980 and the severe economic crisis in Yugoslavia that led to extremely high rates of poverty, unemployment and consequent dissatisfaction in the Kosovo province, paved the way for a Kosovo Albanian nationalist awakening (Pula 2004). In 1981, mass riots broke out in Kosovo, which started as student protests. Ultimately, the demonstrators demanded that Kosovo’s status of an autonomous province is upgraded to a republic inside the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, same as Serbia, Croatia etc. (Troebst 1998). During 1988 and 1989 another wave of mass protests occurred, including a hunger strike of thousands of miners in Trepca (Troebst 1998; Pula 2004). “With the exception of a few small groups, the main political demand voiced by Albanian parties in 1990 was the reversal of Serbia’s constitutional reforms and recognition of the right of Kosovo to become a republic within Yugoslavia” (Pula 2004: 806). In 1990, the Kosovar Albanians also declared their own republic within Yugoslavia. [1946-1991: sub-state secession claim]
* In mid-1991, the recently formed and extremely influential and inclusive Democratic League began to demand independence (Pula 2004: 806-807). The Kosovo Albanian leaders organized a non-violent resistance movement and aimed to establish a “parallel Kosovo Albanian state” (Troebst 1998). Independence remained the dominant claim until 2008, when Kosovo attained independence. Irredentist claims for unification with Albania were rather peripheral and mainly an idea promoted by Albanian nationalists. [1992-2008: independence claim]
  + It is important to note that there were different political views among the Kosovar Albanians, ranging from moderates to radicals. While all political parties in the 1990s agreed on the independence from Serbia, the means to achieve this goal were disputed. During the early 1990s the Kosovo Albanians pursued a strategy of non-violent resistance against the Serbian authorities. However, the discrimination of Kosovo Albanians steadily increased in the 1990s. During the Dayton Conference in 1995, the situation of Kosovo was considered an internal issue of Serbia and thus, not discussed. As a consequence, more radical and violent strategies became more popular in the late 1990s. In the late 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) engaged in a civil conflict with the Serbian army, which ultimately led to the NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999.
* After Kosovo’s secession, a small Albanian population has remained in Serbia, concentrated in the Presevo Valley, and there has been contention for a merger with Kosovo. For instance, in March 2014 the president of the Movement for Democratic Progress (PDP), an ethnic Albanian party, and simultaneously mayor of Bujanovac (a town in the Presevo Valley), argued that the Presevo Valley had always been part of Kosovo and that it had declared its wish to join Kosovo in an (unofficial) March 1992 referendum (Independent 2014; Novinite 2014; Civil War in Europe 2014; Zivanovic 2019). [2009-2020: irredentist claim]

**Independence claims**

* Independence was the dominant claim from 1991 onwards, but Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 159) suggest that there were protests demanding independence in 1989 and Pula (2004) that small groups had demanded independence already before 1991 as well. Jansen (2008) suggests that an underground for the “National Liberation of Kosovo” had been active by 1986 and, possibly, earlier; however, it is not clear based on Jansen whether this group demanded outright independence. [start date: 1989; end date: 2008]

**Irredentist claims**

* Minahan (2002: 1031) suggests that Kosovo had been separated from Serbia by Italy and added to Italian-occupied Albania during WWII, and that Kosovar Albanians resisted re-incorporaton into Yugoslavia until 1946, when the movement was crushed (also see Encyclopedia Britannica). Yet, as Clark 2000: 11, 30f) explains, the Kosovar movement was suppressed already in 1945. [start date: 1944; end date: 1945]
* Minahan (1996: 309) suggests that there were also claims made for a merger with Albania starting in the 1990s. However, all other sources we consulted refer to independence claims.
* See above. [start date: 2008; end date: ongoing]

**Claimed territory**

* Kosovar Albanian claims concerned the current Republic of Kosovo and the Presevo Valley, which remains a part of Serbia. After Kosovo’s independence in 2008, SDM continues to code the Kosovars as an irredentist movement within Serbia (formerly Yugoslavia). For this latter claim, we only code the Presevo Valley. We rely on the Global Administrative Areas database for both claims.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* According to Minorities at Risk, “[a] referendum was conducted [on July 2, 1990] to gauge the support for a new constitution for the Serbian Republic. Of the 86 percent turnout, authorities claimed 96.8 percent support for the constitution. One hundred and fourteen members of the dissolved Kosovar Assembly rejected the constitutional proposals, and declared Kosovo to be an independent republic within the Yugoslav federation.” Also see Troebst (1998); Meier (1999); Pavkovic & Radan (2007: 152) and BBC (2012). [1990: sub-state secession declaration]
* According to the BBC (2012) and Pavkovic & Radan (2007: 152), Kosovar Albanian leaders declared unilateral independence on September 22, 1991. [1991: independence declaration]
* In early 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence (Minorities at Riks Project). [2008: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* MAR’s quinquennial rebellion score is 3 from 1945-1949, suggesting a “local rebellion”. Minahan (2002: 1031) suggests that this is because Kosovar Albanians violently resisted the reincorporation into Yugoslavia in 1945-1946. This is confirmed by Clark (2000: 30f), who refers to this as the “pacification campaign”. According to Clark, an insurrection began in late December after the Yugoslav army decided to ban the Albanian flag on December 13, 1944 and reports of a large-scale massacre of Kosovar men in Skenderaj which left 250 Albanian men dead. Clark suggests that the number of deaths is unknown. He does cite an estimate of 40,000 war dead, though considering this exaggerated (p. 229). Still, the account in Clark suggests that the LVIOLSD threshold was very likely met. It is not clear whether the LVIOLSD was met before January 1: Clark suggests that the violence emerged only after December 13 in 1944 while Minahan refers to 1945-1946 as the dates of this violence. Therefore, we code LVIOLSD in 1945 and do not code prior violence. Note: the more detailed account in Clark (p. 11) suggests that the pacification campaign ended in 1945; thus, we do not extend the LVIOLSD code to 1946, contrary to Minahan.
* The MAR quinquennial rebellion score is again 3 from 1980-1984 (“local rebellion”). This is likely related to the events in 1981, when there were large-scale demonstrations in Kosovo over autonomy that were violently repressed. Clark (2000: 42) suggests the official death toll was 11, including two policemen. Clark also refers to an “internal report for the LCY suggesting over 300 Albanians were killed”, which was originally cited by Amnesty International. We considered this episode too ambiguous to be coded. We found an additional 3 deaths in 1982, 2 deaths in 1983, and 4 deaths in 1987. As we found no clear evidence that the 25 deaths threshold was met, we do not code LVIOLSD in 1981.
* Keesing’s reports that separatist clashes led to 29 deaths in 1989 and 26 deaths in 1990, hence a LVIOLSD coding for those two years. The LVIOLSD code in 1989-1990 is also supported by the UCDP Violent Protest dataset (Svensson et al. 2022). 1991-1997 are again NVIOLSD.
* According to Pavkovic & Radan (2007: 153), the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started a campaign of bombing and assasinations against Serb targets in early 1996, but we found no evidence suggesting that the LVIOLSD threshold was met.
* The HVIOLSD coding for 1998-1999 follows Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl (2019).
* In 2000, ethnic-Albanian rebels began an offensive against Yugoslav security forces in the Presevo Valley bordering Kosovo. Marshall & Gurr (2003: 58, 2005: 85) code armed conflict involving the Albanians in the Presevo Valley in 2000-2001. According to a UNDP report (Bacevic et al. 2011: 15), which cites figures from the International Crisis Group, a total of 100 people were killed in the 17-month insurgency. We code LVIOLSD in 2000-2001.
* There were a few more violent episodes in the 2000s, but casualty estimates do not warrant a LVIOLSD code. [1945: LVIOLSD; 1946-1988: NVIOLSD; 1989-1990: LVIOLSD; 1991-1997: NVIOLSD; 1998-1999: HVIOLSD; 2000-2001; LVIOLSD; 2002-2020: NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* From about 1200 to 1455 Kosovo was part of the Serbian kingdom. In 1455 Kosovo fell to the Ottomans. It remained under the Ottomans until 1912 when Kosovo was conquered and divided between Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria; the largest part went to Serbia and became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) after WWI. During this time, Belgrade expelled 45,000 Albanians from Kosovo and attempted to assimilate local Albanians, including restrictive language policies (Aird n.d.).
* During World War II, a large part of Kosovo was – together with Albania and Western Macedonia – controlled by Italy and later Germany (Troebst 1998), but fell again to Yugoslavia after the war.
* During the interwar period, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) supported various Albanian movements for national recognition in Kosovo. “For instance, in 1923, the CPY issued a programmatic statement in which it resolved that the party’s duty was to help the movements of oppressed nations in their goals of creating independent states, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, as well as the liberation of the Albanians. In 1939 it recognized its cell in Kosovo as a separate branch of the party organization. In 1942, in the midst of war, Tito stated that the CPY will never depart from the principle [of] the right of every nation to self-determination, including secession. For Tito, this included the Albanians of Yugoslavia.“ At the end of 1943, the National Liberation Committee of Kosovo was founded - regional political authorities that the CPY had established in all parts of Yugoslavia (Pula 2004: 799-800).
* In late 1944, after the German withdrawal from Kosovo, the Yugoslav military decided to forbid the display of the Albanian flag (Clark 2000: 30). [1944: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 made Kosovo an autonomous district (oblast) of Serbia (Arhiv Jugoslavije 2008; Pula 2004: 799-800). However, Kosovo’s autonomy was rather symbolic; Kosovo was little more than an administrative division of Serbia and it was dominated by the local Serbs (Pula 2004). Furthermore, the Albanians were not recognized as a nationality (Jansen 1999) and the Albanians suffered from significant discrimination, forced emigration, forced assimilation and political disenfranchisement (Minahan 2002: 1031). We do not code a concession.
* In 1963 Kosovo became an autonomous province and thus got symmetrical status to Vojvodina (Pula 2004: 800). This change was largely symbolic; we do not code a concession.
* In 1968, the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia made some first concessions to the demands of the Albanians in Kosovo: the use of the Albanian flag was legalized and the Kosovo Communist Party became independent (Pula 2004). Moreover, Muslims were recognized as a nationality of Yugoslavia and Albanian as an official language (Mitchell 2010: 311). [1968: cultural rights concession]
* In 1969, the Yugoslav Constitution was amended. Now, Kosovo was recognized as territorial unit at the federal level. Not significant enough, thus not coded.
* By way of the constitutional amendments in 1971, the autonomous provinces (such as Kosovo) got extensive legislative and judicial powers (Ramet 1984). [1971: autonomy concession]
* In 1974, Yugoslavia’s constitution was significantly reformed. The Yugoslav federation was further decentralized and the autonomous provinces, such as Kosovo, received almost equal power to the republics (Ramet 1984). Pula (2004) states that “the provinces became republics in virtually all but name”. [1974: autonomy concession]
* When Milosevic came to power in Serbia, the situation for the Kosovo Albanians changed. In the summer of 1988, Serbian was declared the only official language of Kosovo, and the use of Albanian for official business was disallowed. In the same year, Adem Vllasi was removed as the leader of the League of Communists of Kosovo and replaced by a pro-Serbian. When Albanians protested en mass against these developments, the Serbian government sent the military and declared a state of emergency (Meier 1999). [1988: cultural rights restriction]
* In March 1989 the Serbian Legislative amended the Serbian constitution and thus revoked much of Kosovo’s autonomy (Troebst 1998; Pula 2004; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 326). Ethnic Albanians were fired from the state administration. The Kosovar Albanians set up their own parallel government, including a separate educational system (Pula 2004). [1989: autonomy restriction]
  + We code an onset of separatist violence in connection to violent protests in 1989. According to the MAR Chronology for the Kosovar Albanians, the first emerged in February 1989 in response to the impending revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy. Since the protests emerged in response to the autonomy revocation, we code the restriction in the same year as the violence onset.
* Whatever little autonomy was left was revoked when the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved after the adoption of Serbia’s constitution in July 1990 (Minorities at Risk Project). [1990: autonomy restriction]
  + We code LVIOLSD in 1989-1990 due to violent protests (see above). According to the MAR chronology, the last violent protest was in January 1990 while the restriction was imposed in July 1990. This restriction therefore occurred only after the end of separatist violence.
* In 1998 the Kosovar civil war broke out. In early 1999, the conflict parties met at the Rambouillet castle near Paris. The Contact Group (U.S., France, UK, Germany, Russia, and Italy) urged the conflict parties to sign an autonomy proposal prepared by the Contact Group. The Kosovo Albanian delegation reluctantly agreed, but Yugoslavia refused to sign. This led to the NATO intervention. In June 1999 Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces and to NATO peacekeepers along with UN administrators. Thus Kosovo became de-facto independent from Serbia (Radan 2002: 201). The agreement did not make mention of autonomy and at least formally confirmed Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity (Radan 2002: 201; NATO 1999). Thus we do not code a concession.
* In 2000 Milosevic was voted out of office. Subsequently Serbia repeatedly offered Kosovo autonomy, but there has not been any implementation.
  + Writing in 2002, Minahan (2002: 1034) notes that the new president, Kostunica, has promised to restore Kosovo’s autonomy (Minahan 2002: 1034).
  + The NY Times (2003) reports that the Serbian government rejected calls for Kosovo’s independence and instead adopted a draft document proposing substantial autonomy within the federation of Serbia and Montenegro.
  + In 2005, during preparations to status negotiations over Kosovo, Prime Minister Kostunica repeatedly announced that Kosovo should get “more than autonomy, less than independence.” (SETimes 2005).
  + BBC Monitoring (2006) reports that Serbia’s Prime Minister, Kostunica, unveiled a proposed solution to Kosovo’s status that implies reintegration into Serbia but significant autonomy at talks in Vienna.
  + The Washington Post (2007) reports that Serbia offered Kosovo far-reaching autonomy in 2007.
* Serbia has not recognized Kosovo’s independence. Thus we do not code an independence concession.
* In March 2002, the Yugoslav parliament passed a law on national minorities. In particular, the law outlined the creation of a Federal Council of National Minorities, comprised of reprsentatives of the National Councils of each minority group. The councils are designed to protect minority languages, education, media, and culture (Stroschein n.d.). In particular, the law stipulates that national minorities can use their language within their municipality or locality if they form 15 per cent of the local population, as well as have education in their native language (Petsinis 2003). This can be considered a concession on non-territorial autonomy at least for the Albanians outside Kosovo (especially in the Presevo Valley that borders Kosovo but has remained under Serbia sovereignty) (see Korhecz n.d.). Note that the Albanian minority outside of Kosovo (concentrated in the Presevo Valley that has remained under Serbian sovereignty – Albanians in Kosovo have obviously not formed their national council either given their de-facto independence) has not formed its own national minority council until 2010 (OSCE 2011: 4), but this appears not due to unwillingness on the side of the national government: Huszka (2007: 6) cites two reasons, the first being that “forming their council would imply acceptance of the fact that their country is Serbia” and the second that “Albanian parties failed to form their national council […] due to disagreements about who should be its leader.” As there appear to have been steps towards implementation, we code a concession. [2002: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession]
* In 2009, the Serbian parliament adopted another minority law, which increased the competencies of the minority councils that were introduced back in 2002 (Kokai 2010: 6; OSCE 2010). The Albanian minority formed its minority council in June 2010 (OSCE 2011: 4). [2009: autonomy concession]
* Starting in 2011, EU-led mediation between Serbia and Kosovo has been making some progress on technical issues, such as the recognition of university degrees issued in Kosovo. However, the core controversy, that is, Kosovo’s independence, remains unsolved. In 2018, the presidents from both sides put forward a land swap plan, but it was not implemented (Bieber 2015; International Crisis Group 2021).

**Regional autonomy**

* Autonomy was erected in 1971 and abolished in 1989. The revocation of autonomy in 1989 sparked protests and violence (see above); therefore, we stop coding regional autonomy already in 1988 to better reflect case history. [1972-1988: regional autonomy]
* De-facto independence established in 1999 (Ristic 2010: 900); lasted until Kosovo gained independence in 2008. [2000-2008: regional autonomy]
* The Kosovar Albanians remaining in Serbia (mainly in the Presevo Valley) do not enjoy autonomy.

**De facto independence**

* De facto independence established in 1999. The parallel government that existed since the early 1990s (under Ibrahim Rugova) did not have sufficient control over Kosovo to justify a de facto independence code (Pula 2004; Caspersen 2012). [2000-2008: de facto independence]

**Major territorial changes**

* By way of the constitutional amendments in 1971, the autonomous provinces (such as Kosovo) got extensive legislative and judicial powers (Ramet 1984). [1971: establishment of regional autonomy]
* In March 1989 the Serbian Legislative amended the Serbian constitution and thus revoked much of Kosovo’s autonomy (Troebst 1998; Pula 2004). [1989: abolishment of regional autonomy]
* In June 1999 Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces to the installation of NATO peacekeepers along with UN administrators. Thus Kosovo became de-facto independent from Serbia. [1999: establishment of de-facto independence]
* In 2006, part of the Albanian population became part of newly independent Montenegro, implying a host change. [2006: host change (old)]
* In 2008 Kosovo declared independence. This has been recognized by 101 states, though notably not Serbia. [2008: independence; end of de facto independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Kosovar Albanians |
| *Scenario* | No match/n:1/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Albanians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34506000 (unil and including 2006); 34006000 (2007-2020) |

* The Macedonian Albanians are separately coded. After Macedonia’s secession, we have a 1:1 situation (at least it is close to 1:1: there is a small number of Albanians in Montenegro too).

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1945-1966: discriminated; 1967-1986: powerless; 1987-1999: discriminated; 2000-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* EPR codes the population share for all Albanians with 0.09 throughout 1946-1991. From this we substracted the Macedonian Albanian share (0.0247, see “Macedonian Albanians”), and also apply this estimate to 1945. [1945-1991: 0.0653]
* From 1992 onwards, there is close to a 1:1 scenario (there is also a small number of Albanians in Montenegro), so we use the EPR group size estimate. [1992: 0.1; 1993-2006: 0.17; 2007-2008: 0.21; 2009-2020: 0.008]

**Regional concentration**

* The Kosovar Albanians can be considered spatially concentrated throughout [concentrated]
* Situation before the secession of Kosovo in 2008:
  + According to Minahan (2002: 1029), approx. 80% of Yugoslavia’s Kosovars resides in Kosovo, where they make up 97% of the population.
  + Minahan’s figures are rather high, but the conclusion remains the same if consulting other sources. According to post-independence figures from EPR, Albanians make up 90% of Kosovo’s population.
  + MAR suggests that >75% of the Kosovo Albanians resides in Kosovo.
  + Yugoslavia’s 1991 census counted approx. 2.2 million Albanians (approx. 9% of the population). Note: the category of “Albanians” also includes Albanians in Macedonia, which are separately coded. Approx. 440,000 Albanians lived in Macedonia in 1991. Almost all of the remaining 1.8 million (approx. 1.6 million) lived in Kosovo, where they comprised 82% of the local population. Note: these are estimates because most Albanians in Kosovo boycotted the census, but the conclusion remains the same in earlier censues.
* Situation after Kosovo’s secession in 2008
  + After Kosovo’s secession, a small Albanian population has remained in Serbia, concentrated in the Presevo Valley, where approx. 58,000 out of 62,000 Albanians resided and Albanians made up approx. 65% of the local population according to the 2002 census that was also used for the group size estimate (Kryeziu & Stakić 2014: 8).

**Kin**

* Albanians in neighboring Albania, in Macedonia, and after 2008 also in Kosovo (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Macedonian Albanians

Activity: 1990-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first political parties claiming to speak for the Albanian minority in Macedonia appeared as soon as communism made its way out. The first evidence of organized agitation towards self-determination we found is in February 1990, when there was a demonstration for autonomy, or even independence and attachment to Albania, in Albanian-inhabited districts of Macedonia (Lund 2005: 232). Thus, we code 1990 as the start date of the Macedonian Albanian movement.
* In April 1990, the PPD (Party of Democratic Prosperity) was founded, the first ethnic-Albanian party. In June, another Albanian party was founded, the PDP (Democratic Party of Albanians) (Rexhepi 2008). The Macedonian Albanians movement continued to be active when Macedonia became independent in 1991 (see Albanians under Macedonia). [start date: 1990; end date: host change (1991)]

**Dominant claim**

* In February 1990, there was a demonstration for autonomy, if not independence and attachment to Albania, of Albanian-inhabited districts of Macedonia (Lund 2005: 232). We code an autonomy claim throughout, in particular because the two Macedonian Albanian parties (PPD and PDP) both accepted the territorial integrity of Macedonia (Rexhepi 2008; Minorities at Risk Project; PPD). [1990-1991: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* Lund (2005: 232) suggest that 1,000 protesters demanded unification with Albania in 1990. Yet, the main Albanian parties accepted Macedonia’s territorial integrity. Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 178) suggest that radicals wish to secede from Macedonia in order to unify with Kosovo and / or Albania. [start date: 1990; end date: host change (1991)]

**Claimed territory**

* The clearest articulation of a territorial claim we could find relates to the “Republic of Illyrida”, which Albanian nationalist proposed in the 1990s, with backing from the Macedonian UCK/KLA (Roth 2015: 142). However, the precise extent of this territorial claim remains unclear, as proposals for the republic appear to vary considerably. We flag this claim as ambiguous and code it based on the map shown in Roth (2015: 137).

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence for the period when Macedonia was still part of Yugoslavia, hence a NVIOLSD classification for 1990-1991. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The 1980s saw assimilationist campaigns and repeated acts of repression against ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. For instance, in 1983, teachers in Tetova were disciplined and dismissed from the League of Communists for not observing certain regulations concerning the use of Macedonian in official paperwork. In December 1986, a registrar in Tetova was expelled for registering names “which stimulated nationalist sentiment” (Poulton 1993: 80).
* Repression intensified towards the end of the decade. According to Milosavlevski & Tomovski (1997), in the late 1980s, the Albanian language was removed from public sight, and Albanian families were prohibited from naming their children with Albanian names. Also, Albanian families were prohibited from having more than two children. In 1988, a ban was introduced on restricting the selling of land in western Macedonia to ethnic Albanians. This was to prevent ethnic Albanians buying land, thereby creating ethnically pure areas (Poulton 1993; Bennett 1994). Hence, there was a prior cultural rights restriction due to the events in the late 1980s (we code it in 1988). [1988: cultural rights restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1990 Macedonia’s constitution was amended. The amendment redefined the state from a “state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish nationalities” to a “national state of the Macedonian people” without making mention of Albanians (Poulton 2000). The constitutional amendments were made after the movement’s emergence in February, thus we treat this as a restriction post-movement emergence. [1990: cultural rights restriction]

**Regional autonomy**

NA

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* Macedonia attained independence in 1991, implying a host change. [1991: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Macedonian Albanians |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Albanians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34506000 |

**Power access**

* In Yugoslavia’s final years, Albanians were strongly repressed and actively excluded from state power (cf. EPR coding notes), hence the Macedonian Albanians are coded as discriminated. [1990-1991: discriminated]

**Group size**

* According to the 1991 census, Albanians made up 21.73 per cent of Macedonia’s population. Macedonia made up about 8.8 per cent of Yugoslavia’s population, which yields a group size estimate of 0.0247. [0.0247]

**Regional concentration**

* The majority of Macedonia’s Albanians are concentrated in western Macedonia (MRGI). They form more than 75% of the local population in their “regional base” according to MAR. Further evidence comes from Macedonia’s 2002 census. The 2002 census counted 509,000 Albanians. Macedonia is divided into eight statistical regions. There were 223,000 Albanians in the Polog region, where Albanians make up 73% of the local population. An additional 82,000 Albanians were in the Southwestern region, where Albanians make up 37% of the local population. Combining the two, 60% of the Albanians lived in those two regions, and they made up 56% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* In neighboring Albania, and after Macedonia’s independence also in Yugoslavia (mainly Kosovo), and after 2008 also in Kosovo (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Macedonians

Activity: 1990-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In November 1989, the old pro-Serbian party leadership was dismissed at the Congress of Communists of Macedonia. This opened the way for reforms in Macedonia (Meier 1999: 175-176), such as the introduction of multiparty politics (Babuna 2000: 80). Several amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia were introduced in 1990, for example the “manner and the procedure of using the right to self-determination, including the separation from the federation” (Cvetkovski 1999).
* In spring 1990, several Macedonian parties were founded and on November 11, 1990, the first multiparty elections were held in Macedonia. The main topic of the parties that competed in these elections was the status of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and whether it should remain within Yugoslavia with greater autonomy or become fully independent. VMRO-DPMNE, an advocate of independence, gained most votes (Balkan Insight 2011). 1990 is coded as start date (also see Woodward 1995). Macedonia became independent in 1991, hence the end date of the movement. [start date: 1990; end date: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* In November 1989, the old pro-Serbian party leadership was dismissed at the Congress of Communists of Macedonia. This opened the way for reforms in Macedonia (Meier 1999: 175-176), such as the introduction of multiparty politics (Babuna 2000: 80). Several amendments to the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia were introduced in 1990, for example the “manner and the procedure of using the right to self-determination, including the separation from the federation” (Cvetkovski 1999). In spring 1990, several Macedonian parties were founded and on November 11, 1990, the first multiparty elections were held in Macedonia. The main topic of the parties that competed in these elections was the status of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and whether it should remain within Yugoslavia with greater autonomy or become fully independent. VMRO-DPMNE, which favored independence, gained the most votes (Balkan Insight 2011). A September 1991 referendum reaffirmed the claim to independence. [1990-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date: 1991]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Macedonians consists of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Roth 2015: 137). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Staying in a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs was not an option for the Macedonian government. After the secession of Croatia and Slovenia, there were proposals to integrate Macedonia in a reconstituted rump Yugoslavia or even to partition Macedonia and give parts to neighboring Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia and Greece (Rossos 2006: 112). Following the example of Slovenia and Croatia and based on the right of the federal republics to secede from Yugoslavia granted by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 (Iglar 1992: 219), Macedonia held a referendum on independence in September 1991 (Tagliabue 1991) and declared itself independent from Yugoslavia (Rossos 2006: 110).[1991: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Since 1946, Macedonia had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia and the Macedonians had been recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. The 1953 constitution led to significant decentralization in the economic realm. Despite significant conservative resistances, the country underwent major reforms, including economic reforms that started in 1964/1965 to introduce a market economy, and the democratization of the [League of Communists of Yugoslavia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Communists_of_Yugoslavia) between 1966 and 1969, which led to a larger role of the Leagues of Communists of each individual republic and province (Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984).
* In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144).
* As a result of the Croatian Spring, Yugoslavia was decentralized with the 1971 constitutional reforms. Furthermore, the new Yugoslav constitution that was ratified in 1974 increased the autonomy of the federal republics and regions (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 177-178).

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Macedona attained independence after staging a unilateral referendum on independence and a unilateral independence declaration in late 1991. (Rump) Yugoslavia did not recognize Macedonia’s independence until after the 1995 Dayton Agreement (CEWS Database). Thus, we do not code a concession.

**Regional autonomy**

* Macedonia was one of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics and enjoyed significant autonomy under the 1974 constitution. [1990-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Macedonians |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Macedonians |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34508000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.06]

**Regional concentration**

* Yugoslavia’s 1991 census counted 1.4 million Macedonians. 1.3 million resided in Macedonia, where the Macedonians comprised 65% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* There are Macedonians in Greece (approx. 100,000) and Bulgaria (approx. 20,000) (EPR). [kin in neighboring country]

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## Montenegrins

Activity: 1990-2006

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* In 1988 and 1989 there were mass demonstrations in Montenegro’s capital (then called Titograd). The protests were over economic grievances and the Communist government and not over autonomy or independence (T 1988; Hayden 1992).
* On January 26, 1990, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore (LSCG)) was founded (CDM 2011). One of the main goals of the party was the independence of Montenegro from Yugoslavia (Morrison 2009: 159). Thus, 1990 is coded as start date.
* The LSCG was particularly active as of 1992, when it was the main promoter of Montenegro’s independence in the 1992 referendum (CDM 2011). The LSCG was dissolved in 2005 (CDM 2011), but at this point in time Montenegro’s self-determination was on the political agenda of many other parties too. The movement ends with Montenegro’s independence in 2006. [start date: 1990; end date: 2006]

**Dominant claim**

* Until the late 1990s, the Montenegrin independence movement was small; most Montenegrins wanted to remain in Yugoslavia (Bender 2009). Nevertheless, there has been contention for independence since the early 1990s. On January 26, 1990, the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore, LSCG) was founded (CDM 2011). One of the main goals of the party was the independence of Montenegro from Yugoslavia (Morrison 2009: 159).The LSCG was the main advocate of Montenegrin independence in the 1992 referendum (CDM 2011). Self-determination in the form of increased autonomy or independence gained ground in 1997 (see e.g. Peric-Zimonjic 1997; Bender 2009; Bieber 2003; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 195). The LSCG was dissolved in 2005 (CDM 2011), but at this point in time Montenegro’s self-determination was on the political agenda of many other parties too. In 2002, the Montenegrin government announced that it wants to hold a referendum on independence (Bender 2009). Independence appears to be the dominant claim throughout (though it has to be noted that self-determination claims had little support in the early 1990s). [1990-2006: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1990; end date: 2006]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Montenegrins consists of present-day Montenegro (Roth 2015: 137). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* Montenegro declared its independence on June 3, 2006, shortly after the 2006 independence referendum. Montenegro’s independence was widely recognized within a few days (including Serbia) (Bender 2009). Since the declaration was not a unilateral one but negotiated with Serbia, we do not code it.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found no reports of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Montenegro enjoyed separate independent statehood until 1918, when it was integrated with Serbia (Bender 2009; Minahan 2002: 1297-1298).
* Since 1946, Montenegro had been one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia and the Montenegrins were recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. The 1953 constitution led to significant decentralization in the economic realm. Despite significant conservative resistances, the country underwent major reforms, including economic reforms that started in 1964/1965 to introduce a market economy, and the democratization of the [League of Communists of Yugoslavia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Communists_of_Yugoslavia) between 1966 and 1969, which led to a larger role of the Leagues of Communists of each individual republic and province (Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984).
* In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter a possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144).
* As a result of the Croatian Spring, Yugoslavia was decentralized with the 1971 constitutional reforms. Furthermore, the new Yugoslav Constitution that was ratified in 1974 increased the autonomy of the federal republics and regions (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971; Ramet 1984; Bertsch 1977; Malesevic 2000).
* Milosevic supporters took over the republic in the 1988 anti-bureaucratic revolution. Thus the republic was dominated by Milosevic/Serbia (Hayden 1992). The anti-bureaucratic revolution was widely seen as orchestrated by Milosevic, who aimed to foster his control over the regions. The anti-bureaucratic revolution could be seen as a restriction, but we consider it too ambiguous to be coded.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Milosevic organized a referendum on independence in Montenegro in 1992, which turned out a handy majority against separation. This was essentially a unilateral stunt directed against the independence movement, thus difficult to see as a concession. There were no intentions to implement independence (the aim was to crush Montenegro’s independence movement). Thus we do not code a concession.
* Under Yugoslavia’s 1992 constitution Montenegro continued to have far-reaching autonomy.
* Hewitt & Cheetham (2000: 195) report that the Milosevic regime nationalized the Yugoslav army in the 1990s. We lack a clearer indication as to when this restriction was installed, and tentatively peg it to 1992, the year the new constitution of (rump) Yugoslavia was adopted. [1992: autonomy restriction]
* In 1998 the Montenegrin government started to take over federal functions, establishing its own customs administration, a foreign ministry, and a Central Bank. It introduced the German Mark as Montenegro’s currency (Bender 2009). The Yugoslav authorities tolerated these developments but it is difficult to see them as concessions as these were largely unilateral policies.
* “During the Kosovo conflict in 1999 Montenegro declared neutrality and hosted approximately 70,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees” (Rüegger 2013). In an effort to weaken Milosevic, Montenegro was swamped by (largely unconditional) financial and diplomatic support by the United States and the EU.
* In July 2000, the Federal Parliament introduced several amendments to the constitution. In particular, direct elections to Yugoslavia’s presidency were introduced (in order to allow Milosevic another 8-year term). The amendments decreased Montenegro’s influence at the center and veto position. Montenegro objected strongly to the amendments (Bieber 2010: 942). [2000: autonomy restriction]
* With the Belgrade Agreement of March 14, 2002, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was established (Bender 2009). The federal republic of Yugoslavia was reorganized as a looser confederal-type union. [2002: autonomy concession]
* The agreement included the possibility that Montenegro could hold a referendum on its independence after three years (Bieber 2010: 943). [2002: independence concession]
* Montenegro declared its independence on June 3, 2006, shortly after the 2006 independence referendum. Serbia recognized Montenegro’s independence within days (Bieber 2010: 941; Vidmar 2007). The pre-referendum phase had involved lengthy negotiations particularly on the voting method (supermajority requirements).We do not code another concession since the referendum and the possibility of independence had been part of the 2002 agreement.

**Regional autonomy**

* The Montenegrins enjoyed territorial autonomy throughout, first as a republic of the Socialist Yugoslav Federation (SFRJ, 1963-1992), then in the rump-Yugoslavia, Savezna Republika Jugoslavija (SRJ) (1992-2003) and finally, in the renamed Serbia and Montenegro, the Drzavna Zajednica Srbija I Crna Gora (SCG, 2003-2006) (Ristic 2010: 897; Minahan 2002: 1298-1299). [1990-2006: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2006: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Montenegrins |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Montenegrins |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34509000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: senior partner, 1992-2006: junior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [1990-1991: 0.02; 1992: 0.03; 1993-2006: 0.05]

**Regional concentration**

* According to the 1991 census, the Montenegrins can be considered spatially concentrated in Montenegro, but in later censuses the share of Montenegrins in Montenegro drops below 50%. Nevertheless, the Montenegrins can be regarded as spatially concentrated throughout because they primarily live in the country’s central and southern areas. [concentrated]
  + The 1991 census counted 540,000 Montenegrins. 380,000 resided in Montenegro (70%), where the Montenegrins comprised 62% of the local population.
  + If considering Montenegro as a whole, the Montenegrins can no longer be considered spatially concentrated in the 2002/2003 census. According to the 2002/2003 census, approx. 80% of Serbia and Montenegro’s 336,000 Montenegrins resided in Montenegro, but they made up only 43% of Montenegro’s population of 620,000.
  + However, municipality level data suggests that the Montenegrins can be considered spatially concentrated, if only in the country’s central and southern areas are considered. The Montenegrins formed absolute majorities in six of Montenegro’s 21 municipalities, and relative majorities in another four. The ten municipalities are adjacent and all lie in Montenegro’s central and southern parts. Approx. 66% of all Montenegrins resided in the resulting territory, and they made up 58% of the local population.
    - Cetinje 17,000 out of 18,000
    - Nikšić 47,000 out of 75,000
    - Podgorica 96,000 out of 169,000
    - Danilovgrad 11,000 out of 17,000
    - Kolašin 5,000 out of 10,000
    - Mojkovac 6,000 out of 10,000
    - Bar: 19,000 out of 40,000
    - Budva: 7,000 out of 16,000
    - Kotor 11,000 out of 23,000
    - Žabljak 2,000 out of 4,000

**Kin**

* No kin found. [no kin]

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## Sandzak Muslims

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The collapse of Communism in 1989 stirred the long-dormant Sanjaki nationalism. In 1990 the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was formed to represent the interests of Serbia’s Muslims, primarily those in the Sandzak region. We therefore peg the start date of the movement to 1990.
* Other political parties representing the interests of the group include: the Sandzak Coalition, List for Sandzak, People’s Movement of Sandzak and a union of five small parties created in 2000 called the National Movement of Sandzak.
* While the various parties each have their own agenda, there are several Sandzak wide issues, important to all. There is a belief that the region needs to be recognized by the government of Yugoslavia. While this is a call for autonomy, the group has made it clear that they are not interested in full independence, just recognition as an autonomous region in order to provide equal rights, protection of their religion, and to provide the group a greater say in the policies of the state government.
* Many Muslims believe that the current election laws discriminate against them in that they prevent them from gaining an appropriate level of representation. Additionally, they want all political parties to be allowed to operate without being repressed. While the violence against the Muslims has been less severe recently, protection from the Serbs is also a key demand of the group.
* The Sandzak wing of the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action (SDA) continued to press for an autonomous Sandzak region in the 2000s (Bugajski 2002; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 263f, 325f; International Crisis Group 2005 ; Keesing’s; Lexis Nexis; Marshall & Gurr 2003; Minahan 1996: 474ff, 2002: 1642ff; MAR).
* After Montenegro’s secession in 2006, the Sandzak region was split between Serbia and Montenegro. Although Roth (2015) suggests that the Sandzak Muslim SDM is now dormant, we found evidence suggesting continued separatist mobilization. Specifically, the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak continued to make autonomy claims (The Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak 2022). [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* The Sandzak movement is widely described as an autonomy movement (e.g. Bieber n.d.; Minorities at Risk Project; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 263-264). However, between roughly 1991 and 1993 a portion of the Sandzak leaders also advocated secession from Serbia and merger with Bosnia. Todorovic (2012: 48) argues that the Sandzak Muslims’ claims followed a trajectory similar to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia (who first demanded autonomy and then the merger with a larger Serbia). There continued to be calls for autonomy, but since there appears to have been quite significant contention for a merger with Bosnia at the time, we code an irredentist claim during these years.
* Justification for the autonomy code in 1990-1992: [1990-1992: autonomy claim]
  + Sandzak’s SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije Sandzaka or Democratic Action Party Sandzak) is the most important organization associated with the movement (Todorovic 2012: 57). Sandzak’s SDA was established as a branch of the Bosnian SDA in 1990 and immediately advocated autonomy (Todorovic 2012: 37).
  + During the 1990s, Ugljanin was clearly Sandžak’s undisputed Bosniak political leader, and he remains a powerful political force. Before the war, Ugljanin advocated a sovereign and territorially integral Bosnia and a “special status” for Sandžak within the rump Yugoslavia, arguing that this would resolve the Muslim Slav national question in the former Yugoslavia (Lyon 2008: 87).
  + During Yugoslavia's 1990 multiparty elections, Muslims in both Sandžak and Bosnia had voted heavily for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Muslim nationalist party, whose leader, Alija Izetbegović, said Bosnia had legitimate territorial interests in Sandžak and encouraged Sandžak Muslims to demand autonomy from Serbia and Montenegro.
  + On May 11, 1991, the SDA established the Muslim National Council of Sandžak (MNVS), which, although illegal at the time, followed the pattern of ethnic groups in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. From its creation, the council sought political and territorial autonomy for Sandžak, and national and cultural emancipation for Muslims (Lyon 2008: 78-79).
  + A 1991 referendum held in the Sandzak region affirmed the claim to autonomy. However, it has also to be noted that the referendum explicitly left open the question of future integration with Bosnia.
* Justification for the irredentist claim in 1993: [1993: irredentist claim]
  + In 1991, but particularly after the separation of from rump-Yugoslavia in 1992, some Sandzak leaders began talk of seceding from Serbia and joining Bosnia. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Sandzak Muslims found themselves separated from their ethnic kin in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The repressive policies of Serbia and Montenegro under the dominance of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević during the 1990s led to instances of ethnic cleansing and human rights violations of Muslims in Sandzak. In March 1992, a leading Sandžak Muslim politician openly threatened secession if Serbia refused to grant the region autonomy (Ron 2003: 68). At a 1992 conference in Vienna, “the leader of the SDA announced possible secession” (Todorovic 2012: 50). According to Ron (2003: 68), the specter of Sandžak secession in the early 1990 was quite real.
  + Note that there continued to be calls for autonomy.
* Justification for the autonomy code in 1994-2020: [1994-2020: autonomy claim]
  + When it became clear that the international community would not support a merger with Bosnia, the leaders of the SDA scaled down their claims. A 1993 memorandum issued by the SDA demanded autonomy within Yugoslavia and did not make mention of secession. This document has remained the official platform of the MNVS, which, in 1993, renamed itself the Bosniak National Council (BNVS). The authorities in both Serbia and Montenegro reacted angrily, accusing the MNVS leadership of treason and secessionism. This led to the eventual prosecution of the top SDA leadership (Lyon 2008: 78-79; also see Minahan 2002: 1645-1946).
  + In 1997, Ugljanin announced the possibility of proclaiming Sandzak’s autonomy, referring to the 1991 referendum (Mirkovic 2002). Tensions subsequently peaked again (Lyon 2008: 88). In 1999 another Declaration was published that defined the Sandzak Bosniaks as a distinct national entity and that the main goal was the establishment of regional autonomy for them (Todorovic 2012: 50). In its new program, published in 2009, the Bosnian Democratic Party of Sandzak (founded in 1996) demands the “decentralization and regionalization of Serbia and the right of the citizens of Sandzak on regional autonomy, in accordance with the European standards and the interests of citizens” (Bošnjačka demokratska stranka Sandžaka 2014). Autonomy is also mentioned as a goal in a more recent program of The Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak (The Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak 2022).
  + It has to be noted that there continued to be some calls for a merger with Bosnia. In particular, Sulejman Ugljanin continued to emphasize that Sandzak would not remain in the new Yugoslavia (Todorovic 2012: 50-51).
  + In addition there were also calls for the formation of a separate Sandzak republic within Serbia and Montenegro (Minahan 2002: 1647). This claim figures rarely in the sources we consulted.

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

* Between roughly 1991 and 1993 a portion of the Sandzak leaders also advocated secession from Serbia and merger with Bosnia (see above). Since Bosnia became independent in 1992, this amounts to an irredentist claim for those years. [start date: 1992; end date: 1993]

**Claimed territory**

* Sandzak Muslims have demanded more autonomy for the historical Sandzak region, which straddles the current borders of Serbia and Montenegro. Sandžak today does not exist as an administrative region within Serbia or Montengro, but generally encompasses up to six municipalities in Serbia (Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Priboj, Nova Varoš) and six in Montenegro (Bijelo Polje, Rožaje, Plav, Pljevlja, Berane, Andrijevica) (Bieber n.d.). We code all areas until after Montenegro’s secession in 2006, after which we only code the areas in Serbia (cf. Rondic 2000). We code these claims based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

NA

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We found only minimal evidence of separatist violence, hence a NVIOLSD classification. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* The Sandzak became part of Serbia and Montenegro in 1912 after the First Balkan War. Before it had been under Ottoman rule (where the Sandzak Muslims used to have their own district, san¢ak means district in Turkish) (International Crisis Group 1998). During WWI, the Sandzak came under Italian rule. The Yugoslav partisan movement briefly entertained the idea of giving the Sandzak autonomy, but after the war the Sandzak was again divided between Serbia and Montenegro. Thus the Sandzak did not have an overarching administration (as it used to have under the Ottomans) (International Crisis Group 1998; Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 264). In 1968, the Muslims were recognized as a nationality of Yugoslavia equal to Serbs and Montenegrins (Bieber n.d.; Mitchell 2010: 311).
* We found no concession or restriction (as defined here) in the ten years before the start date.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* Serbia’s 1990 constitution confirmed the revocation of Kosovo’s and Vojvodina’s autonomy. We found no restriction relating to the Sandzak Muslims, however.
* During the 1990s under Slobodan Milošević’s regime, Muslims in Serbia became the victims of state terror that saw widespread official discrimination and the ethnic cleansing of entire villages (Lyon 2008: 71; Morrison 2008: 4; Minorities at Risk Project; Minahan 2002: 1646). According to Morrison (2008: 4): “When the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began in April 1992, physical attacks against the Sandzak’s Muslim population significantly increased. During April and May 1992, Serbian paramilitaries roamed menacingly around Muslim villages in both the Serbian and Montenegrin Sadnzak. […] The Muslim inhabitants of the Sandzak were continually subjected to violence and intimidation. Within a year, Novi Pazar [the largest city in the Sandzak] was surrounded by Yugoslav Army tanks”. State terror (repression of physical integrity rights) is not coded, however.
* Yugoslavia’s 1992 constitution, adopted after the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia, did no longer recognize Muslims as a constitutive nationality (Bosnia and hence most Muslims had left the union). Muslims were not even recognized as a national minority – contrary to Hungarians, Albanians, Ruthenians and Slovaks (International Crisis Group 1992: 11). [1992: cultural rights restriction]
* The end of the war in BiH slightly changed Serbia’s policies towards the Sandzak Muslim (Todorovic 2012: 53). For instance, Ugljanin, the leader of the SDA party, was allowed to return home from exile. However, no concession in the sense employed here could be identified.
* “Ugljanin and his allies soon implemented policies that alienated local Serbs and made them feel that they were the subject of discrimination. On 16 December 1996, the president of Novi Pazar’s municipal executive board, Izudin Sušević, announced that no Socialists would be among the board’ s six newly appointed members. On the same day, Ugljanin’s coalition of Bosniak parties and the local municipal assembly nominated candidates for the school board. All were Bosniaks, and Serbian leaders complained bitterly. In another show of insensitivity, they hung the BNVS flag, which bears an Islamic symbol, in the city government building. In March 1997, Novi Pazar municipal authorities announced that they would soon replace all directors of local public enterprises who were members of the SPS or were Serbs, and the SPS members on the municipal assembly began boycotting meetings in protest. Several weeks later, a Serb member of the assembly warned that Serbs might establish a parallel government in Novi Pazar if “discrimination” continued. Soon, the SPS charged that Ugljanin and his protégés were working to make Sandžak an independent state. On 10 July 1997, Belgrade finally reacted against what many Serbs regarded as Bosniak nationalist provocations. Police entered the municipal building, threw out the assembly, and replaced it with an acting assembly comprised exclusively of SPS and JUL members, some of whom were Bosniaks” (Lyon 2008: 88; also see Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 264). We do not code an autonomy restriction since this concerns the municipal level.
* Since the overthrow of Milošević on October 5, 2000, much has changed regarding Serbia’s relationship with its Muslim minority in the Sandžak (Lyon 2008: 91). The Serbian government began investing in the region’s infrastructure and economic development (Lyon 2008: 92). In 2000, Serbia started to change its discriminatory practices and passed appropriate laws for the protection of its minorities (Mirkovic 2002). The new Serbian regime attempted to integrate Sandzak Muslims into the system, rather than excluding them from it (Morrison 2008: 9). In March 2002, the Yugoslav parliament passed a law on national minorities. In particular, the law outlined the creation of a Federal Council of National Minorities, comprised of representatives of the National Councils of each minority group, including the Hungarians. The councils are designed to protect minority languages, education, media, and culture (Stroschein n.d.). In particular, the law stipulates that national minorities can use their language within their municipality or locality if they form 15 per cent of the local population, as well as have education in their native language (Petsinis 2003). The Sandzak Muslims (Bosniaks) were officially recognized as a national minority (Todorovic 2012: 55). Overall the (comprehensive yet flawed) 2002 minority law arguably improved the status of the Sandzak Muslims (Bieber n.d.). We (also) code an autonomy concession because the minority councils can be understood as a form of non-territorial autonomy (Korhecz n.d.). [2002: cultural rights concession, autonomy concession]
* In 2009, the Serbian parliament adopted another minority law, which increased the competencies of the minority councils that were introduced back in 2002, and hence the cultural autonomy of Hungarians in Serbia (Kokai 2010: 6; OSCE 2010). [2009: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Non-territorial forms of autonomy (i.e. the above-mentioned minority councils) are not coded.

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* In 2006 Montenegro attained independence, implying a host change for those Sandzak Muslims located in Montenegro. [2006: host change (old)]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Sandzak Muslims |
| *Scenario* | n:1/1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Bosniaks/Muslims |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34504000 (until 2006)/34004000 (from 2007 onwards) |

* Until and including 1992, the Sandzak Muslims form part of EPR’s Bosniaks/Muslims. After the secession of Bosnia we have a 1:1 scenario (most remaining Bosniaks are Sandzak Muslims).

**Power access**

* EPR codes the Bosniaks as senior partner in 1990-1991 because Yugoslavia’s executive was composed of eight members, one from each republic/autonomous republic. Serbia’s seat evidently went to a Serb. Thus the Sandzak Muslims were not directly represented (and, by way of the system of the collective presidency, indeed systematically excluded from executive power). This is at the border of outright discrimination, but since the policy was not targeted at this group we apply a powerless code. [1990-1992: powerless]
* For 1993-2020, we draw data from EPR. [1993-1999: discriminated; 2000-2020: powerless]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 1642) reports an estimate of 525,000 in Sanjakis in 2002. By contrast, EPR suggests a lower number. EPR’s group size estimate for 1993-2006 – when there is a 1:1 scenario (see above) is 3%. Based on the 1991 census, Yugoslavia’s population in 1993 was ~10,121,209 (1991 total-Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia). As a result, EPR estimates that there are about 304,000 Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia.
* EPR’s 1993 estimate is 3%. Based on the 1991 census, Yugoslavia’s population in 1993 was ~10,121,209 (1991 total-Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia). As a result, EPR estimates that there are about 304,000 Sandzak Muslims in Yugoslavia.
* Since we link the Sandzak Muslims 1:1 with EPR’s Muslims for 1993 onwards, we also draw on the EPR estimate in previous years.
  + 1990-1991: Yugoslavia’s total population was 23,229,846 according to the 1991 census, suggesting the following relative group size. [1990-1991: 0.0131]
  + In 1991 Slovenia, Croatia, and Maceonia seceded. Based on the 1991 census, Yugoslavia’s total population was now 14,498,262, suggesting the following relative group size. [1992: 0.021]
  + For 1993 ownards, we follow EPR. [1993-2006: 0.03; 2007-2008: 0.014; 2009-2020: 0.023]

**Regional concentration**

* Pre-2006 (before Montenegro’s secession):
  + According to MAR, the Sandzak Muslims are territorially concentrated in the Sandzak, a region in southeastern Serbia and Montenegro, where more than 75% of that group resides (see gc7 in phase V release). Figures from Minahan (2002: 1642) also suggest that the vast majority of the Sandzak Muslims resides in the Sandzak, where they comprise an absolute majority of the local population.
  + Data from the 2002 and 2003 censuses conducted in Serbia and Montenegro, respectively, provides further evidence in this direction, though suggesting that the Sandzak Muslims primarily reside in the eastern part of the Sandzak, while Serbs dominate the western part.
    - According to the 2002/2003 censuses, Muslims form an absolute portion in the following four congituous municipalities: Sjenica, Novi Pazar, and Tutin (all Serbia) as well as Rozaje (Montenegro). 73% of Serbia and Montenegro’s 184,000 Bosniaks (Muslims) resided in those four municipalities, and they made up 80% of the local population.
    - Note: there was an absolute Muslim majority in one other municipality, Plav in Montenegro. This municipality is not contiguous to the other four mentioned above. The two municipalities that lie in-between Plav and the other four municipalities, Berane and Bijelo Polje (both Montenegro), are ethnically mixed with a Serbian plurality.
    - Montenegro (48,000 Bosniaks)
      * Rozae: 19,000/23,000
      * Plav: 7,000/14,000
      * Berane: 6,000/35,000
      * Bijelo Polje: 11,000/50,000
    - Serbia (136,000 Bosniak)
      * Sjenica: 21,000/28,000
      * Novi Pazar: 66,000/86,000
      * Tutin: 28,000/30,000
  + The Sandzak Muslims continue to be concentrated after Montenegro’s secession in 2006. The three Serbian municipalities mentioned above, Sjenica, Novi Pazar, and Tutin, continue to have absolute Muslim majorities, and approx. 75% of Serbia’s Bosniaks live in this area. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* EPR codes the following groups: Bosniaks in Bosnia, Slovenia, Kosovo, Croatia, and Montenegro. The number of Bosniaks in Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Kosovo is below the 100,000 threshold. Thus, we consider only the Bosniaks in BiH. [1990-1992: no kin; 1993-2020: kin in neighboring country]

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## Slovenes

Activity: 1968-1972; 1986-1991

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* The first overt stirrings of Slovenian nationalism in the post-WWII phase came in the mid- and late 1960s, when the “national question” became one of the central themes of Slovene journalism and cultural discussion. Slovenia’s political elite began to make reformist claims in the direction of increased autonomy for Slovenia and economic reform. The first clear-cut evidence for something that can be interpreted as organized activity we found is in 1968, when a number of speakers at the Slovenian Congress of the League of Communists spoke of Slovenian statehood and sovereignty. Unlike in the case of Croatia, the Slovenian reform movement did not develop into a mass movement. It was led and limited to parts of Slovenia’s Communist elite, in particular Stane Kavcic who was president of Slovenia from 1967-1972 and aimed for a more independent position for Slovenia within Yugoslavia. In 1972, Kavcic was forced to resign and the Slovenian reform movement was suppressed (Vodopivec 1992: 233-236; Radan 2002: 167). Based on this, we code a first non-violent phase of activity from 1968-1972. [start date 1: 1968; end date 1: 1972]
* Calls for Slovenian sovereignty resurfaced in the mid-1980s (Mastnak 1990; Woodward 1995; Cohen 1993; Ramet 1993; Stokes et. al 1996; Vankovska 2002). The (re-)awakening of Slovene nationalism is commonly referred to as the “Slovenian Spring”. By 1986 Slovene nationalists were criticizing the Yugoslav People’s Army and requesting greater autonomy (Vankovska 2002: 4). In line with this, Ramet (1993: 870) notes that “Slovenia’s drive toward independence must be dated to 1986, when the liberal wing within the League of Communists of Slovenia triumphed over the conservative wing and ousted the conservatives from the party leadership.” Hence, we peg the start date of the second phase at 1986.
* In January 1987 the *New Review* published 16 articles of intellectuals and dissidents claiming the “introduction of political pluralism, democracy, a market economy, and independence for Slovenia“ (Nova Revija 1987; Suligoj 1999). The critical journal *New Review* had been founded already in 1980 (Rupel 2005: 45), but had not published radical or contentious articles in the earlier years. As a reaction to the 1987 issue of the *New Review*, in 1988 four journalists were arrested and put before military trial (the ‘Ljubljana trials’, see Rupel 2005: 45).
* Following the trials, the Slovenian Spring became a mass movement with large demonstrations. The Yugoslav leadership under Slobodan Milosevic unsuccessfully tried to restrict the independence movements in Yugoslavia by organizing pro-government mass demonstrations (the so-called “meetings of truth”). However, although planned, such events did not take place in Slovenia. Slovene police forces stopped Serb demonstrators at the Slovenian border (Suligoj 1999: 4).
* In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments, which underlined Slovenian sovereignty and declared that only the Slovenian parliament itself could authorize the declaration of a state of emergency in Slovenia, or the movement of Yugoslav military forces into the republic (Hayden 1992: 658; Ramet 1993: 871).
* In 1990, the Slovenian delegation, headed by Milan Kucan, prompted the dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist Party when they left the Party Congress due to disagreement with Milosevic’s politics (Stojanovic 1995: 343). On March 7, 1990 the Slovenian Assembly changed the official name of the state to the “Republic of Slovenia”. In April 1990, the first democratic elections in Slovenia took place. In 1991, Slovenia became independent. [start date 2: 1986; end date 2: 1991]

**Dominant claim**

* We code an autonomy claim for the first phase based on the following account:
  + The first overt stirrings of Slovenian nationalism in the post-WWII phase came in the mid- and late 1960s, when the “national question” became one of the central themes of Slovene journalism and cultural discussion. Slovenia’s political elite began to make reformist claims in the direction of increased autonomy for Slovenia and economic reform. The first clear-cut evidence for something that can be interpreted as organized activity we have found is in 1968, when a number of speakers at the Slovenian Congress of the League of Communists spoke of Slovenian statehood and sovereignty. Unlike in the case of Croatia, the Slovenian reform movement did not develop into a mass movement. It was led and limited to parts of Slovenia’s Communist elite, in particular Stane Kavcic who was president of Slovenia from 1967-1972 and aimed for a more independent position for Slovenia within Yugoslavia. In 1972, Kavcic was forced to resign and the Slovenian reform movement was suppressed (Vodopivec 1992: 233-236; Radan 2002: 167). [1968-1972: autonomy claim]
* In 1986, Slovene nationalists began to request greater autonomy (Vankovska 2002: 4). In January 1987 the *New Review* published 16 articles of intellectuals and dissidents claiming the “introduction of political pluralism, democracy, a market economy, and independence for Slovenia” (Nova Revija 1987; Suligoj 1999). In September 1989, the Communist leadership of Slovenia unilaterally declared Slovenia sovereign over Yugoslavia, but by that time the opposition, had easily outbid the Communist party, calling for outright independence (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 146). The independence-minded opposition won the first multi-party elections in the spring of 1990 (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147). In 1990, after the nationalist opposition had taken over power, Slovenia and Croatia issued a joint document proposing a Yugoslav Confederation composed of sovereign and independent republics (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 147). A referendum held in late 1990 showed massive support for independence. Based on this, we code an autonomy claim for 1986-1989, and an independence claim for 1990-1991 (in accordance with the first of January rule). [1986-1989: autonomy claim; 1990-1991: independence claim]

**Independence claims**

* See above. [start date: 1989; end date: 1992]

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* The territory claimed by the Slovenes consists of present-day Slovenia (Roth 2015: 137). We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* In 1989, Slovenia declared itself sovereign over the Yugoslav federation and passed amendments to the constitution that reinforced the right to secede (Ramet 1993: 871; Sulgoj 1999: 6). [1989: autonomy declaration]
* Based on the right of federal republics to secede from Yugoslavia, which is granted by the Yugoslav constitutions of 1946, 1963 and 1974, (Iglar 1992: 219), Slovenia declared itself independent from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991. On December 23, 1990, the vast majority of the Slovene population had voted in favor of a sovereign and independent Slovene state. [1991: independence declaration]

**Separatist armed conflict**

* The LVIOLSD coding for 1991 follows UCDP/PRIO. [1968-1972, 1986-1990: NVIOLSD; 1991: LVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* 1st phase:
  + Slovenia became part of Yugoslavia in 1918. In 1946, Slovenia became one of the six federal republics of Yugoslavia. Compared to other Yugoslav republics, Slovenia was relatively wealthy (Stokes et. al 1996: 140), had a relatively homogenous population (90 percent Slovenes) and no neighbor made claims on the Slovene territory (Ramet 1993: 869).
  + The 1953 constitution led to significant decentralization in the economic realm. Despite significant conservative resistances, the country underwent major reforms, including economic reforms that started in 1964/1965 to introduce a market economy, and the democratization of the [League of Communists of Yugoslavia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Communists_of_Yugoslavia) between 1966 and 1969, which gave Leagues of Communists in the different republics and provinces more autonomy (Denitch 1977; Ramet 1984). [1966: autonomy concession]
  + In the 1960s, the Slovenian Communist Party was led by reformists under Evard Kardelj and initiated modernization reforms of the economy and society. Consequently, the Slovenian federal republic became economically much more developed than more southern Yugoslav republics and regions.
  + The Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted six amendments to the 1963 Constitution on April 19, 1967, which inter alia considerably increased the powers of the Council of Nationalities and abolished the offices of Vice-President of the Republic and Deputy Supreme Commander. The enlargement of the powers of the Council of Nationalities was accordingly designed to ensure that Federal legislation respected the equal rights of all regions and did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Republics (Keesing’s Record of World Events: May 1967). [1967: autonomy concession]
* 2nd phase:
  + From 1973 onwards, the reform pace decreased, given that conservative factions controlled the Slovene Communist Party (Svincena Leta). Nevertheless, Slovenia remained a major economic force in Yugoslavia, producing 20 percent of Yugoslavia’s GDP and 25 percent of the Yugoslav exports. In the context of the economic crisis in the 1980s, the differences between the Yugoslav republics became more evident, and the Slovenes perceived themselves as being economically exploited by the federal administration, which resulted in disaffection among the Slovene population (Suligoj 1999: 5).
  + The federalization efforts noted below culminated in the 1974 constitution, which granted the six federal republics as well as to the two autonomous Serbian provinces increased autonomy.

**Concessions and restrictions**

* In 1969, “a second tier of armed forces, a lightly armed territorial defense force was put in place to deter possible Soviet invasion.” Each republic got control over this second tier of defense on its own territory and over its police and security apparatus (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 143-144). [1969: autonomy concession]
* After several months of intense and often embittered controversy, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted on June 30, 1971, a series of amendments to the Constitution which limited the powers of the Federal Government to defence, foreign affairs, foreign trade and the unity of the economic and social system, all other matters falling within the authority of the six Republics composing the Federation. The amendments also established a Presidency of 22 members in which all the Republics were equally represented (Keesing’s Record of World Events: August 1971). [1971: autonomy concession]
* In 1989, Milosevic initiated an economic blockade against Slovene products (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 146; Rogel 2004: 18). At the time Milosevic was the president of Serbia rather than Yugoslavia, but given Milosevic’s and Serbia’s prominent role within the weak Yugoslav federation, this is coded as an autonomy restriction. We found no evidence suggesting that the blockade was lifted before Slovenia’s independence in late 1991. [1989: autonomy restriction]
* In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed a series of constitutional amendments, which underlined Slovenian sovereignty, and declared that only the Slovenian parliament itself could authorize the declaration of a state of emergency in Slovenia, or the movement of Yugoslav military forces into the republic (Hayden 1992: 658; Ramet 1993: 871). Since this constitutes unilateral legislation and since the amendments were strongly opposed by the federal authorities, we do not code this as a concession.
* Slovenia held a plebiscite on independence in late 1990 and declared independence in June 1991. The independence declaration led to a short armed conflict between Slovenian and Yugoslav forces. A cease-fire was signed in July by all six republics (Brioni Agreement) that “introduced a three month moratorium on the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, handed over the international border control to Slovenia’s government, lifted the Slovenian blockade of the Yugoslav army garrisons in Slovenia and introduced EC monitors to oversee the ceasefire” (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 148).
  + Note: The handing over of border control to Slovenian police simply re-established the status quo ex-ante before the outbreak of armed conflict in June (Hanson 2000: 85) and is thus not coded as an autonomy concession.
* The Brioni Agreement eventually paved the way for Slovenian independence (Radan 2002: 174). In late 1991, the first countries recognized Slovenia’s independence: the three Baltic countries, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus and then, in December, Germany, Sweden and Iceland. January 15, 1992, the EC Council of Ministers recognized the independence of both Croatia and Slovenia (Pavkovic & Radan 2007: 148). It can be argued that Milosevic (at the time de-facto the leader of Yugoslavia) eventually came to terms with Slovenian independence, given the lack of a Serbian minority in Slovenia. [1991: independence concession]
  + Note: The independence concession is not unambiguous. The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia had repeatedly declared Slovenia’s actions illegal. The last ruling we have found dates from October 1991 (Radan 2002: 169, 173). Furthermore, Milosevic’s acquiescence was of a rather informal nature. The Brioni Peace Agreement had provided for a three months moratorium on Slovenian independence. These negotiations started in late July, but soon broke down. When the moratorium ended, Slovenia effectively proceeded unilaterally without the official agreement of the Yugoslav state (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia).
  + This concession occurred after the onset of violence earlier in 1991.

**Regional autonomy**

* Although, until the early 1970s, Slovenia’s autonomy was limited compared to the situation after the 1974 constitution, the Slovenes still had some meaningful autonomy (Bertsch 1977; Denitch 1977). [1968-1972: regional autonomy]
* The 1974 constitution provided for extensive autonomy, including the use of the Slovene language as one of the official languages in Yugoslavia, economic policies or elections. [1986-1991: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [1991: independence]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Slovenes |
| *Scenario* | 1:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Slovenes |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34507000 |

**Power access**

* We follow EPR. [senior partner]

**Group size**

* We follow EPR. [0.08]

**Regional concentration**

* Both MAR and GeoEPR code the Slovenes as concentrated. Census data confirms that almost all Slovenes lived in the Slovene republic, where they comprised a large majority. For example according to the 1981 census, 95% of the 1.75 million Slovenes lived in Slovenia, where they made up 91% of the local population. [concentrated]

**Kin**

* According to EPR there are Slovenes in Austria. Yet, their population is only about 20,000 according to the 1981 census (MRGI). EPR, too, pegs their population at below 100,000. [no kin]

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## Vojvodina Serbs

Activity: 1990-2020

**General notes**

NA

**Movement start and end dates**

* Hungarians in the Vojvodina, a region in northern Serbia, have campaigned for increased autonomy since the early 1990s, but so have local Serbs. Fuelled by nationalist sentiments in other constituent republics Vojvodine nationalism emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Minahan (2002: 2003), “Vojvodine activists [i.e., Serbs from Vojvodina] joined the region’s Hungarians in demanding republican status for Vojvodina.” However, it was only after the autonomy of Vojvodina was revoked by Milošević’s regime in 1989 that a movement for autonomy emerged.
* In 1996, the Vojvodina Coalition, an association of seventeen parties and organizations, signed the Manifesto for Vojvodina Autonomy (Minahan 2002: 2004). The coalition’s main components, the Reformists of Vojvodina and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, had been formed already in 1990. It appears that these parties advocated for autonomy since their foundation. 1990 is coded as start date.
* There is evidence of continued activity. For instance, in 1998 the leader of Vojvodina’s coalition of opposition parties demanded autonomy, and this demand is periodically repeated (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 314; Barlovac 2013; Zivanovic 2017). Thus, we consider the movement ongoing as of 2020. [start date: 1990; end date: ongoing]

**Dominant claim**

* Support for Vojvodina’s autonomy has been strong among the region’s Hungarians, but many of the region’s ethnic Serbs also support autonomy given Vojvodina’s rather distinct history and strong regional economy relative to Serbia (Stroschein n.d.). “According to the 2006 Serbian Constitution, Vojvodina should get 7% from the Republic budget each year, but that has never happened.  In reality, Vojvodina has been contributing 35%-40% of national budget annually, while receiving less than its constitutional 7%” (Despotovic 2012).
* Multiple Serb groups have advocated increased autonomy for the Vojvodina region. For instance, In 1998 the leader of Vojvodina’s coalition of opposition parties demanded autonomy (Hewitt & Cheetham 2000: 314). Other Serb groups, such as the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), categorically oppose any further separation from Belgrade (Stroschein n.d.).
* In a 2003 poll, 75 percent of Vojvodina residents supported some degree of autonomy within Serbia (Bohnet & Parramore 2013). After the war in Kosovo and the NATO air campaign (that had heavily targeted Novi Sad, the capital of Vojvodina), Vojvodina became a stronghold of the Serbian opposition and resistance to the Milosevic regime (Stroschein n.d.). Moderate Serbian parties that advocate more autonomy for the Vojvodina received broad popular support in Vojvodina compared to more radical and centralist Serbian parties, such as the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) (Bieber & Winterhagen 2006: 6).
* Stroschein (n.d.) states that “Vojvodina contains two branches of support for autonomy“. The first one is multi-ethnic, including many Serbs, and consists of local elites that want to re-establish the autonomy of Vojvodina similar to before 1990. Their aims are greater territorial autonomy and more political and fiscal powers. They are primarily driven by the fact that Vojvodina is wealthier than the rest of Serbia. While demands range from regional autonomy within the structures of Serbia to the establishment of a form of federation with Serbia, no party in this movement demands full independence of Vojvodina. The second self-determination movement in Vojvodina consists of ethnic Hungarians.
* In sum, the dominant demand is clearly for autonomy within Serbia/Serbia and Montenegro/Yugoslavia. [1990-2020: autonomy claim]

**Independence claims**

NA

**Irredentist claims**

NA

**Claimed territory**

* Vojvodina Serbs have claimed the Vojvodina region in today’s northern Serbia. The area is composed of seven districts: North Bačka, Central Banat, North Banat, South Banat, West Bačka, South Bačka, and Syrmia, also called Srem. We code this claim based on the Global Administrative Areas database.

**Sovereignty declarations**

* At the end of 1995, several opposition groups published the “Manifesto of Vojvodina”. The manifesto was signed in May 1996 by a total of seventeen political organizations (Briza 1995). The manifesto demanded autonomy for Vojvodina (Devetak 1997: 75) but did not unilaterally declare sovereignty. Thus no declaration is coded.

**Separatist armed conflict**

* We find no evidence of separatist violence, hence the entire movement is coded as NVIOLSD. [NVIOLSD]

**Historical context**

* Vojvodina became an autonomous province of Serbia in 1945, but at first only enjoyed a small level of autonomy. The 1971 constitutional amendments and the 1974 constitution gave the Vojvodina significant autonomy (Fox 1996). However, in 1988, the members of the ethnically and religiously diverse provincial assembly of Vojvodina resigned and were replaced by Serbs who shared Milosevic’s irredentist ambitions following the anti-bureaucratic revolution. The anti-bureaucratic revolution is widely seen as orchestrated by Milosevic, who aimed to foster his control over the regions. It could be seen as a restriction, but we considered this too ambiguous to be coded.
* In 1989 Vojvodina’s autonomy was revoked (Fox 1996; Ristic 2010). [1989: autonomy restriction]

**Concessions and restrictions**

* The 1990 constitution reiterated the revocation of autonomy (Fox 1996; Ristic 2010). We do not code a restriction since Vojvodina’s autonomy had already been abolished in 1989.
* By way of the 2002 Omnibus Law, Vojvodina regained many of the competencies that it had lost when its autonomy was taken away in 1989 (Minority Rights Group International; Omnibus Zakon 2002). In particular, Vojvodina gained autonomy over cultural and economic affairs. Since then, Vojvodina maintains its own 120-member assembly (Stroschein n.d.). [2002: autonomy concession]
* In 2006, Serbia adopted a new Constitution that further increased the autonomy of the Vojvodina province in terms of financial autonomy (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2006). [2006: autonomy concession]
* On November 30, 2009, the Serbian Parliament ratified the Constitution/Statue of the autonomous province Vojvodina (that was drafted by the provincial parliament in 2008). The provincial constitution came into force on January 1, 2010. The new constitution conferred additional autonomy upon Vojvodina, and thus comes closest to the autonomy rights that the Vojvodina had had before 1990 (Radio Free Europe 2009). [2009: autonomy concession]

**Regional autonomy**

* Vojvodina re-attained its autonomous status in 2002 (see above). We code autonomy from 2003 onwads, following the first of January rule. [2003-2020: regional autonomy]

**De facto independence**

NA

**Major territorial changes**

* [2002: establishment of regional autonomy]

**EPR2SDM**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| *Movement* | Vojvodina Serbs |
| *Scenario* | n:1 |
| *EPR group(s)* | Serbs |
| *Gwgroupid(s)* | 34501000 (until and including 2006); 34001000 (from 2007 onwards) |

**Power access**

* The Vojvodines form part of EPR’s ‘Serbs’. The Serbs are coded as ‘senior partner’ until and including 2006 and as ‘dominant’ henceforth. The Vojvodina Serbs’ power status is somewhat ambiguous during the Milosevic era (-2000). Until 1991 Yugoslavia’s executive was composed of 9 members, one from each republic/autonomous republic. The presidency rotated. However, in 1988 Milosevic took control of Vojvodina’s seat in Yugoslavia’s presidency and in 1989 Milosevic revoked Vojvodina’s autonomy. Thus the Vojvodina (and the Vojvodina Serbs) retained their seat but it is debatable whether the representative can be seen as a representative of the Vojvodina Serbs. We code the Vojvodina Serbs as included because a similar thing happened in Montenegro (also there Milosevic installed his supporters) and EPR continues to see the Montenegrins as included. [1990-1992: junior partner]
* In 1992 Yugoslavia’s collective presidency was abolished and instead a single president was instituted. The president nominated a prime minister. Even though Milosevic held the presidency only from 1997-2000, de-facto it was him who dominated the Federal Republic. Again, we code the Vojvodina Serbs as included, which appears to follow EPR’s practice (despite Milosevic’s dominance, the Montenegrins are coded as included). [1993-2003: junior partner]
* In 2003 a confederation of Serbia and Montenegro was established with a five-member federal executive. The confederation was extremely loose and most decisions were taken at the level of the constitutent republics. Vojvodina Serbs appear to have had representation in Serbia’s executive (if the place of birth is taken as criterion: Dragan Veselinov (2001-2003), Zoran Lončar (2004-2008), Radomir Naumov (2004-2007), all born in Vojvodina, served as ministers). [2004-2006: junior partner]
* Vojvodina Serbs continued to have representation in the Serbia’s national executive after Montenegro’s secession (again if place of birth is taken as indicator: Zoran Lončar (2004-2008), Radomir Naumov (2004-2007), Svetozar Čiplić (2008-2011), and Saša Dragin (2007-2011), all born in Vojvodina, served as ministers). Recent examples include the current deputy prime ministers Maja Gojkovic and MilosVucevic. [2007-2020: junior partner]

**Group size**

* Minahan (2002: 1999) provides an estimate of 1.645 million Vojvodine Serbs. Note: the 2011 census counted 1,289,635 Serbs in Vojvodina, thus Minahan’s estimate is rather on the higher end. Nonetheless, we draw on Minahan, in line with general practice.
* Note: the group size changes in 1992, 1993, 2007, and 2009 due to the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, respectively.
  + According to the 1991 census, Yugoslavia’s total population was 23,229,846, suggesting the following group size estimate in combination with Minahan. [1990-1991: 0.0708]
  + In 1991 Slovenia, Croatia, and Maceonia seceded. Based on the 1991 census, Yugoslavia’s total population was now 14,498,262, suggesting the following group size estimate in combination with Minahan. [1992: 0.1135]
  + In 1992 Bosnia seceded. Based on the 1991 census, Yugoslavia’s total population was now 10,121,209, suggesting the following group size estimate in combination with Minahan. [1993-2006: 0.1625]
  + In 2006 Montenegro seceded. Based on the 1991 census, Serbia’s total population was now 9,506,174, suggesting the following group size estimate in combination with Minahan. [2007-2008: 0.173]
  + In 2008 Kosovo seceded. According to the 2011 census, Serbia’s population was 7,186,862, suggesting the following group size estimate in combination with Minahan. [2009-2020: 0.2289]

**Regional concentration**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1999), the Vojvodina Serbs make up 52% of their homeland, the Vojvodine republic, where approx. 61% of all Vojvodina Serbs live. [concentrated]
  + Note: There are no official estimates of the number of Vojvodina Serbs, but according to census data, Serbs made up an absolute majority in Vojvodina in the 1991, 2002, and 2011 census (57%/65%/67%).

**Kin**

* According to Minahan (2002: 1999), there are Vojvodina Serb communities in Croatia, Romania, and Hungary, as well as “small” communities in western Europe and North America. Minahan does not provide more exact figures, but the Serbian communities in Romania and Hungary are <100,000 while it appears unlikely that more than 100,000 out of the approx. 200,000 Serbs in Croatia (580,000 before the war) would see themselves as Vojvodina Serbs. [no kin]
  + Note: We do not code Serbs more generally (in particular in Bosnia and Croatia) as ethnic kin because this is a movement by Serbs against a Serbian-dominated government.

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